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Discipline as Method: Interdisciplinarity as Epistemic Intervention

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Abstract

Interdisciplinary research is frequently conceptual

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Preamble

Discipline as Method: Interdisciplinarity as Epistemic Intervention
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Abstract:
Interdisciplinary research is frequently conceptualized as an integrative endeavor that synthesizes disciplinary perspectives to yield more holistic explanations of complex phenomena. Although this integrative paradigm has yielded valuable outcomes, it often frames disciplinary differences principally as barriers to be surmounted.

Drawing on insights from science and technology studies (STS), this article advances an alternative epistemological framework by reconceptualizing disciplines not as repositories of accumulated knowledge but as historically stabilized methodological apparatuses that actively constitute explanatory objects and practices. Building upon this reconceptualization, the article develops an interventionist epistemology that positions disciplinary differences as generative epistemic resources rather than impediments. The proposed framework delineates a three-stage mechanism—interpretive juxtaposition, cognitive friction, and methodological reflexivity—whereby the deliberate and sustained copresence of incommensurable explanatory logics disrupts the naturalized authority of any single disciplinary method, thereby fostering reflexive scrutiny of underlying epistemic commitments and normative implications.

Through illustrative cases from climate policy modeling, management research, and evidence-based medicine, the analysis demonstrates how interpretive juxtaposition manifests across diverse institutional contexts, generating cognitive friction that prompts methodological reflexivity without necessitating premature synthesis or resolution of differences. These examples illustrate that prolonged exposure to plural explanatory regimes can productively intervene in epistemic assumptions, thereby reshaping the conditions of legitimate judgment and knowledge production. The article concludes by elaborating the implications of reframing interdisciplinarity as epistemic intervention rather than integration, and by identifying promising directions for future empirical inquiry within STS, including investigations into the institutional conditions that enable or constrain such reflexive dynamics.

Keywords: discipline as method; interdisciplinarity; epistemic intervention; disciplinary difference; methodological reflexivity; science and technology studies (STS)

1. Introduction

Interdisciplinary research has become a central organizing principle in contemporary knowledge production, particularly in response to complex socio-technical problems such as climate change, public health, and organizational governance. Across policy documents, funding schemes, and academic discourse, interdisciplinarity is commonly framed as a solution to the limitations of disciplinary specialization, promising more comprehensive, integrated, and actionable knowledge (Klein, 1990; Repko & Szostak, 2023).

Underlying this enthusiasm is a largely implicit epistemological assumption: that disciplinary differences represent partial perspectives on a shared reality, and that the primary task of interdisciplinary research is to reconcile or integrate these perspectives into a more unified explanatory framework. From this viewpoint, differences in concepts, methods, and standards of evidence are treated as technical challenges that can, in principle, be overcome through improved coordination, translation, or methodological synthesis.

Science and technology studies (STS), however, has long questioned this integrative ideal. Instead of treating disciplines as neutral containers of knowledge, STS research emphasizes their role as epistemic cultures—historically stabilized configurations of methods, instruments, interpretive norms, and evaluative criteria that shape how phenomena are rendered knowable in the first place (Knorr-Cetina, 1999). From this perspective, disciplinary differences are not merely obstacles to integration but constitutive features of knowledge production that structure what counts as a legitimate explanation.

This insight complicates the dominant narrative of interdisciplinarity. If disciplines embody distinct methodological commitments and epistemic assumptions, then efforts to integrate them may risk obscuring precisely those differences that generate alternative ways of understanding complex problems. Moreover,

the persistence of incommensurability across disciplinary frameworks suggests that integration is neither inevitable nor always desirable (Kuhn, 1962; Galison, 1997).

Existing STS scholarship has offered rich accounts of how disciplinary boundaries are constructed, negotiated, and maintained, as well as how coordination across differences is achieved through devices such as boundary objects and translation practices (Star & Griesemer, 1989; Gieryn, 1983). While these studies have significantly advanced our understanding of interdisciplinary collaboration, they tend to focus on how differences are managed or stabilized in practice, at the expense of examining how differences might actively intervene in epistemic assumptions.

This article addresses that gap by proposing a theoretical shift from integration to intervention as an alternative way of conceptualizing interdisciplinarity. Specifically, it advances the argument that disciplinary differences can function as epistemic interventions when they are deliberately juxtaposed instead of being prematurely reconciled. To capture this dynamic, the article introduces the notion of interventionist epistemology, a framework that focuses on how interdisciplinary encounters can disrupt the taken-for-granted status of disciplinary methods and provoke reflexive engagement with explanatory practices themselves.

Central to this framework is the claim that disciplines should be understood as methods rather than as accumulations of knowledge. When multiple disciplinary methods are brought into sustained juxtaposition around a shared problem, their underlying assumptions become mutually visible, generating what this article terms cognitive friction. Under certain institutional and interactional conditions, such friction can give rise to methodological reflexivity: a heightened awareness of the limits, scope, and normative implications of one' s own explanatory framework.

2. Disciplinary Difference and Interdisciplinarity: An STS Perspective

Discussions of interdisciplinarity are commonly framed in terms of coordination and integration across disciplinary boundaries. In much of the policy-oriented and methodological literature, disciplines are treated as complementary knowledge domains whose differences can be bridged through shared concepts, integrative models, or methodological synthesis (Klein, 1990; Repko & Szostak, 2023). Within this view, disciplinary difference appears as a transitional condition: a challenge to be managed on the way toward more comprehensive explanation.

Science and technology studies (STS) has approached this issue from a different angle. Departing from the view of disciplines primarily as repositories of specialized knowledge, STS research emphasizes their role as historically stabilized configurations of methods, instruments, interpretive norms, and evaluative standards. From this perspective, disciplinary differences are not merely epistemic

gaps to be filled but durable features of knowledge production that shape how phenomena are rendered intelligible in the first place (Knorr-Cetina, 1999).

2.1 Disciplines as Epistemic Cultures

A central contribution of STS has been the reconceptualization of disciplines as epistemic cultures. This notion highlights that disciplines differ not only in what they study but in how they produce and validate explanations. Experimental practices, modeling strategies, forms of argumentation, and standards of evidence are embedded in disciplinary routines that confer legitimacy on particular ways of knowing while marginalizing others (Latour, 1987; Knorr-Cetina, 1999). Moreover, these disciplinary routines do more than just filter information; as Latour and Woolgar (1979) demonstrated in their laboratory ethnography, the very 'facts' of science are products of specific methodological interventions and inscriptions. By framing disciplines as methods, we acknowledge that the 'objects' of interdisciplinary inquiry are always-already constituted by the technical and conceptual apparatuses of their respective epistemic cultures. This perspective is further developed in Boon and Van Baalen (2019), who advocate for an engineering paradigm in science, where interdisciplinary collaboration leverages epistemic tools to address cognitive and epistemological challenges without assuming unified knowledge.

Seen in this light, disciplinary coherence does not arise from convergence on a single representation of reality, but from the stabilization of shared interpretive practices. What appears self-evident within a discipline is often the product of long-term methodological alignment rather than empirical inevitability. As a result, disciplinary explanations are internally robust yet externally difficult to translate. This insight has important implications for interdisciplinarity. If disciplines embody distinct epistemic cultures, then encounters across disciplinary boundaries involve more than the exchange of information; they entail the interaction of different methodological commitments and assumptions about what counts as an adequate explanation.

2.2 Incommensurability and the Limits of Integration

The persistence of disciplinary difference has frequently been discussed through the concept of incommensurability. While originally formulated in the philosophy of science, the notion has been productively taken up in STS to describe situations in which explanatory frameworks lack shared criteria of evaluation or common conceptual ground (Kuhn, 1962; Galison, 1997). In interdisciplinary contexts, incommensurability does not imply the impossibility of communication. Rather, it signals that communication requires negotiation, translation, and selective alignment. Importantly, such processes are rarely neutral. Integrative efforts often privilege particular methods or forms of reasoning, thereby establishing implicit hierarchies among disciplines (Mitchell, 2003).

Much of the interdisciplinarity literature treats incommensurability as a problem

to be solved. Integration, in this sense, becomes a normative ideal: differences are expected to be reduced, harmonized, or rendered compatible. This integrative ideal finds its most systematic contemporary expression in the work of Bammer (2013), who proposes 'Integration and Implementation Sciences' (I2S) as a formal framework for synthesizing diverse knowledge to solve complex problems. However, from an STS perspective, such frameworks risk treating disciplinary difference as a problem of 'management' or 'optimization' to be resolved, rather than a productive epistemic force in its own right. STS research complicates this assumption by showing that integration may come at the cost of suppressing alternative explanatory logics and obscuring the methodological assumptions that underlie dominant frameworks.

2.3 Coordination, Boundary Objects, and Their Epistemic Limits

To account for how interdisciplinary collaboration proceeds despite persistent differences, STS has developed analytical concepts such as boundary objects. Boundary objects are artifacts, models, or concepts that are sufficiently flexible to be interpreted differently across social worlds, yet stable enough to enable coordination (Star & Griesemer, 1989). These mechanisms are effective in explaining how cooperation is achieved without consensus. However, their epistemic implications are more ambiguous. By facilitating coordination, boundary objects often render methodological differences less visible, allowing collaboration to proceed without confronting deeper disagreements about explanation and evidence (Gieryn, 1983). From the standpoint of interdisciplinarity as epistemic practice, this raises an important limitation. While coordination mechanisms stabilize interaction, they may also dampen opportunities for reflexive engagement with disciplinary assumptions. In such cases, difference is managed rather than examined.

2.4 From Managing Difference to Mobilizing Difference

Taken together, STS scholarship provides a rich descriptive account of how disciplinary differences are produced, maintained, and coordinated. What remains less explored is whether and how such differences might be actively mobilized as epistemic resources as opposed to being treated as constraints. This article builds on STS insights while shifting the analytical focus from the management of difference to its potential for epistemic intervention. By conceptualizing disciplines as methods rather than as bodies of knowledge, it becomes possible to ask how the deliberate juxtaposition of disciplinary explanations can disrupt their taken-for-granted status and provoke reflection on explanatory frameworks themselves.

The following section develops this argument by specifying the mechanism through which such intervention becomes possible. It introduces the concepts of interpretive juxtaposition, cognitive friction, and methodological reflexivity, which together form the core of the interventionist epistemology proposed in this article.

3. Interventionist Epistemology: Interpretive Juxtaposition, Cognitive Friction, and Methodological Reflexivity

The preceding section showed that disciplinary differences are not merely residual obstacles to integration but stable features of epistemic cultures. This section builds on that insight by developing a theoretical framework that explains how such differences can be actively mobilized to intervene in epistemic assumptions. The central claim advanced here is that interdisciplinarity can function not only as a mode of coordination or synthesis, but also as a form of epistemic intervention.

To articulate this claim, the section introduces the concept of interventionist epistemology. The term does not refer to normative control over knowledge outcomes, nor to methodological engineering aimed at producing consensus. Instead, it designates a mode of epistemic engagement in which the conditions under which explanations are produced and evaluated become objects of reflection. This shift in focus—from explanatory results to explanatory frameworks—distinguishes interventionist epistemology from integrative approaches to interdisciplinarity.

3.1 Interpretive Juxtaposition: Beyond Integration

In much of the interdisciplinarity literature, bringing together multiple disciplinary perspectives is implicitly oriented toward integration. Explanations are expected to converge, whether through shared models, hybrid concepts, or synthesized methods (Klein, 1990; Repko & Szostak, 2023). Interpretive juxtaposition departs from this orientation by suspending the demand for convergence. It refers to the deliberate placement of multiple disciplinary explanations side by side without prescribing a hierarchy or a path toward reconciliation. Crucially, what is juxtaposed are not merely different conclusions but different ways of explaining: problem framings, causal logics, evidentiary standards, and assumptions about relevance. The analytical focus thus shifts from what is explained to how explanation is accomplished.

This form of juxtaposition is neither accidental nor purely descriptive. It involves the active design of epistemic situations in which disciplinary methods are rendered mutually visible. In doing so, interpretive juxtaposition makes explicit what often remains implicit within disciplinary practice: the methodological devices through which phenomena are constituted as objects of knowledge (Knorr-Cetina, 1999).

3.2 Cognitive Friction: Difference as Epistemic Provocation

When disciplinary explanations that are internally coherent yet methodologically incommensurable are sustained in juxtaposition, their coexistence generates what this article terms cognitive friction. Cognitive friction arises not from empirical disagreement alone, but from the confrontation of incompatible explanatory logics. Drawing on Tsing' s (2005) concept of 'friction' in global

encounters, this cognitive friction is not a sign of collaborative failure but a generative site of engagement. These interdisciplinary tensions represent the 'sticky materiality' through which new knowledge claims are forged. Friction, in this sense, does not merely impede movement; it enables the traction necessary for epistemic change. This generative potential of friction is echoed in recent interdisciplinary analyses, such as those by Talbi and van Woerden (2025), who demonstrate how epistemological clashes in team settings provoke reflection on disciplinary hierarchies and enable pluralistic outcomes.

Unlike cognitive dissonance, which is typically conceptualized as an individual psychological state, cognitive friction is a relational epistemic condition. It emerges between explanatory frameworks, distinct from conflicts within beliefs, and it cannot be resolved by the accumulation of additional data or minor adjustments to existing models. Instead, cognitive friction directs attention to the underlying assumptions that structure explanation itself (Kuhn, 1962). Importantly, cognitive friction is not inherently disruptive in a negative sense. While it may produce uncertainty or discomfort, it also creates a space in which the naturalized authority of any single disciplinary explanation is weakened. In such moments, explanation becomes visible as a situated practice rather than a transparent reflection of reality. Complementing this, Braun et al. (2025) advocate for epistemic reflexivity in innovation contexts, illustrating how workshops and questionnaires can intervene in epistemic cultures to promote ongoing, performative reflection on explanatory assumptions.

3.3 Methodological Reflexivity: Reflecting on Explanation

Cognitive friction does not automatically result in reflexivity. Its epistemic significance depends on whether actors are positioned—and institutionally enabled —to engage with friction as a source of reflection and not merely a problem to be eliminated. When this condition is met, cognitive friction can give rise to methodological reflexivity. Methodological reflexivity refers to an awareness of the contingent, situated, and partial character of one' s own explanatory framework. This aligns with the 'reflexive turn' in the sociology of scientific knowledge (Woolgar, 1988), which demands an interrogation of the very representational practices we use to describe the world. Building on this, van der Lee and Zweekhorst (2022) propose competencies like epistemic stability and adaptability, which enable reflexive integration in sustainability contexts, allowing actors to navigate functional disagreements and foster pluralistic understandings. In an interventionist framework, reflexivity moves beyond individual self-reflection to become an epistemic outcome where the 'taken-for-granted status' of one' s own method is replaced by an acute awareness of its constitutive limits. Rather than abandoning judgment or embracing relativism, reflexive actors reassess the scope, limits, and normative implications of their methods. Explanation remains possible, but it is no longer taken for granted (Mitchell, 2003).

From this perspective, reflexivity is not an individual virtue but an epistemic outcome shaped by interactional and institutional arrangements. Interpretive

juxtaposition provides the structural condition for such reflexivity by sustaining exposure to alternative explanatory logics without prematurely closing them down through integration or hierarchy.

3.4 The Mechanism as an Epistemic Process

Taken together, interpretive juxtaposition, cognitive friction, and methodological reflexivity form a dynamic epistemic process rather than a linear sequence. Juxtaposition creates the conditions under which friction may emerge; friction, in turn, opens the possibility of reflexive engagement with explanatory assumptions. The process may repeat, intensify, or stall depending on contextual factors such as institutional incentives, professional norms, and evaluative regimes. Recent empirical applications, such as the diagnostic framework developed by Ligtermoet et al. (2025), further elucidate this dynamic, demonstrating how preparatory reflexivity in interdisciplinary teams can sustain epistemic intervention across iterative cycles.

What is distinctive about this mechanism is that it does not aim to resolve difference. Instead, it leverages difference to intervene in the epistemic foundations of explanation. Empirical support for this process comes from van Lambalgen and de Vos (2023), who show how tools in undergraduate projects enhance epistemic fluency, enabling students to reflexively navigate methodological differences and achieve integrative outcomes through moderated interactions. In doing so, interventionist epistemology reframes interdisciplinarity as a practice that reshapes how knowledge claims are made, justified, and evaluated. This reframing finds support in contemporary transdisciplinary research, including Manuel-Navarrete et al. (2025), who outline inner shifts to embrace epistemic diversity, thereby enhancing the potential for intervention in addressing complex challenges.

3.5 Summary: From Mechanism to Empirical Illustration

This section has specified the core mechanism through which disciplinary differences can function as epistemic interventions. By shifting attention from integration to juxtaposition, and from agreement to reflexivity, the framework provides a conceptual basis for analyzing interdisciplinary practices beyond their capacity to produce unified knowledge. The next section illustrates this mechanism through cases drawn from distinct knowledge domains. These cases are not intended to test the framework in a causal sense, but to demonstrate how interventionist epistemology operates in practice under different institutional conditions.

4. Illustrating Interventionist Epistemology in Practice

The purpose of this section is to illustrate how interventionist epistemology operates in concrete knowledge practices. The cases below are not intended to offer empirical tests of the proposed mechanism; instead, they serve an analytic

function: they show how interpretive juxtaposition can be enacted in different institutional contexts, how cognitive friction becomes visible, and how methodological reflexivity may emerge as a result. The cases are drawn from climate policy modeling, management research, and evidence-based medicine. These domains were selected not for their representativeness, but because each involves well-established interdisciplinary arrangements in which disciplinary differences are routinely encountered and managed. As analytic cases, they are intended to clarify the scope and variability of the proposed mechanism rather than to establish causal generalizations (Flyvbjerg, 2006).

4.1 Climate Policy Modeling: Juxtaposing Rationalities of Decision

Climate policy modeling provides a paradigmatic example of institutionalized interdisciplinarity. Integrated assessment models (IAMs) combine insights from climate science, economics, and policy analysis to inform decision-making on mitigation pathways and risk management (Edwards, 2010). These models are often presented as successful instances of knowledge integration. From an interventionist perspective, however, the epistemic significance of climate modeling lies less in integration than in the coexistence of distinct modeling rationalities. Climate models emphasize physical processes and uncertainty ranges; economic models foreground cost–benefit calculations and equilibrium assumptions; policy-oriented models privilege feasibility and governance constraints (Jasanoff, 2004). Each approach produces internally coherent explanations, yet relies on different assumptions about what counts as relevant evidence and reasonable inference.

When these models are juxtaposed without being collapsed into a single output, their differences become epistemically productive. Cognitive friction emerges not as disagreement over numerical projections, but as uncertainty about the appropriate grounds for policy judgment. In such situations, decision-makers are prompted to reflect on the limits and normative implications of model-based reasoning itself, shifting the focus away from the search for a definitive forecast.

4.2 Management Research: Methodological Pluralism and Organizational Phenomena

Management research constitutes another domain in which disciplinary differences are both pervasive and institutionally regulated. Quantitative studies rooted in economics and psychology, qualitative case analyses informed by sociology, and complexity-oriented modeling approaches often address similar organizational phenomena while employing markedly different explanatory strategies (Davis, 2010). These approaches are frequently framed as complementary routes toward a unified theory of organizations. Yet in practice, attempts at synthesis often privilege particular methods as more rigorous or generalizable. Interpretive juxtaposition offers an alternative orientation by allowing multiple explanatory logics to coexist without forcing methodological alignment.

When competing explanations of organizational performance or innovation are juxtaposed, cognitive friction arises at the level of research design rather than empirical findings. Researchers are confronted with the fact that methodological choices shape not only results but also the kinds of questions that can be asked. Under such conditions, methodological reflexivity may emerge as scholars reassess the assumptions embedded in their preferred approaches and the forms of explanation they enable.

4.3 Evidence-Based Medicine: Hierarchies of Evidence and Clinical Judgment

Evidence-based medicine (EBM) represents a highly formalized attempt to regulate interdisciplinary knowledge through hierarchical standards of evidence. Randomized controlled trials are positioned at the top of the evidentiary hierarchy, while observational studies, clinical experience, and qualitative insights are assigned lower status (Evidence-Based Medicine Working Group, 1992). STS research has shown that this hierarchy, while effective for standardization, encounters limitations in complex clinical contexts where patient heterogeneity, comorbidities, and social factors play a significant role (Timmermans & Berg, 2003). In such settings, clinicians are often exposed to multiple forms of explanation that cannot be easily reconciled within a single evidentiary framework.

Here, interpretive juxtaposition occurs not by design but through practice. Statistical evidence, experiential knowledge, and contextual understanding are brought into relation without a clear rule for integration. The resulting cognitive friction challenges the naturalized authority of evidence hierarchies and opens space for reflection on what counts as valid medical knowledge in specific situations. Methodological reflexivity thus emerges as an outcome of navigating epistemic plurality rather than as a rejection of scientific standards.

4.4 Comparing Cases: Stability and Variability of the Mechanism

Across these cases, a common pattern can be observed. Interpretive juxtaposition renders methodological differences visible; cognitive friction destabilizes taken-for-granted assumptions; and methodological reflexivity becomes possible under conditions that sustain exposure to difference. At the same time, the form and intensity of this process vary across institutional contexts. In climate policy modeling, reflexivity primarily concerns the rationality of decision support. In management research, it centers on methodological legitimacy and scope. In medicine, it involves the authority and applicability of evidentiary standards. These variations suggest that interventionist epistemology is not a uniform outcome but a context-sensitive process shaped by institutional arrangements and professional norms. Extending these cases to educational contexts, Tripp and Shortlidge (2019) introduce a framework emphasizing disciplinary humility, where reflexivity about epistemic limitations facilitates interdisciplinary integration in undergraduate science curricula.

5. Conclusion: Interdisciplinarity as Epistemic Intervention

The article proposes a reorientation of interdisciplinarity—from a primary focus on knowledge integration to an understanding of it as a form of epistemic intervention. From this perspective, the value of interdisciplinary engagement lies not only in what kinds of knowledge it generates, but in how it intervenes in the assumptions, methods, and evaluative standards that underpin explanation itself.

Central to this reorientation is the conceptual shift from disciplines as bodies of knowledge to disciplines as methods. When disciplines are understood as methodologically organized ways of explaining phenomena, their differences appear not as residual obstacles to be overcome, but as structured variations in epistemic practice. This shift allows disciplinary difference to be analyzed as a potential resource for reflexive engagement rather than as a technical problem of coordination.

Building on this insight, the article has developed a framework of interventionist epistemology to explain how disciplinary differences can be deliberately mobilized in interdisciplinary contexts. The proposed mechanism—comprising interpretive juxtaposition, cognitive friction, and methodological reflexivity—clarifies how sustained exposure to multiple, incommensurable explanatory frameworks can disrupt the taken-for-granted authority of any single method. Importantly, this process does not depend on achieving consensus or synthesis. Instead, it operates by rendering methodological assumptions visible and open to reflection.

The illustrative cases from climate policy modeling, management research, and evidence-based medicine demonstrate how this mechanism can operate across diverse institutional settings. While differing in form and intensity, each case shows that when disciplinary explanations are juxtaposed free from the pressure to be prematurely integrated, cognitive friction emerges at the level of explanatory rationality. Under certain conditions, this friction enables actors to reassess the scope, limits, and normative implications of their methods. These cases thus underscore the context-sensitive character of interventionist epistemology while also highlighting its broader applicability.

The article' s contribution to STS lies in extending existing analyses of disciplinary difference and interdisciplinarity beyond questions of coordination and boundary management. While prior research has provided valuable accounts of how differences are stabilized or negotiated in practice, this study emphasizes how differences can actively intervene in epistemic assumptions. In doing so, it offers a conceptual vocabulary for analyzing interdisciplinarity as a reflexive epistemic practice rather than solely as an organizational or methodological arrangement.

At the same time, the scope of the argument is deliberately limited. Interventionist epistemology is not proposed as a universal or normative ideal for

all interdisciplinary endeavors. In contexts where standardization, efficiency, or decisive action is paramount, integrative approaches may remain both necessary and appropriate. Moreover, epistemic intervention does not arise automatically from disciplinary diversity; it depends on institutional conditions that sustain interpretive juxtaposition and allow cognitive friction to be engaged rather than suppressed.

These limitations point directly to avenues for future research. Empirical studies could examine how specific institutional designs—such as evaluation criteria, funding structures, or publication norms—facilitate or constrain the emergence of interventionist epistemology. Comparative analyses might explore how different professional cultures respond to sustained epistemic friction, and whether reflexive engagement varies across actors and settings. Such research would help specify the conditions under which interdisciplinarity functions not only as a mode of knowledge production, but as a means of reshaping epistemic judgment.

In conclusion, by conceptualizing interdisciplinarity as epistemic intervention, this article seeks to broaden the analytical horizon of STS research on disciplinary difference. In an era marked by complex socio-technical challenges, the capacity to reflect on how explanations are produced may be as consequential as the capacity to integrate knowledge. Recognizing and mobilizing disciplinary difference as a methodological resource thus opens new possibilities for understanding—and practicing—interdisciplinarity.

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