

Analysis and Implications of the 2023 U.S. Intelligence Community Global Threat Assessment Report

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Abstract

Purpose/Significance: Based on the latest annual Global Threat Assessment report of the U.S. intelligence community, this study clarifies its strategic intelligence work direction, grasps the U.S. intelligence community's perception of global security threats, and thereby provides references and lessons for our national security work. **Methods/Process:** Employing research methods such as textual analysis and summarization and generalization to dissect and interpret the report's content, it is concluded that the U.S. intelligence community places particular emphasis on key issues such as "international competition," "non-traditional security," "transnational issues," and "regional conflicts." **Results/Conclusion:** Based on the above analysis and with reference to the latest trends in U.S. global security strategy, it is ultimately recommended that our national security work should be guided by the holistic national security concept, adopt a forward-looking perspective to prevent and resolve potential risks at home and abroad, and resolutely safeguard national security.

Full Text

Analysis and Implications of the U.S. Intelligence Community's 2023 Global Threat Assessment Report

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Abstract

[Purpose/Significance] Based on analysis of the latest annual Global Threat Assessment report from the U.S. intelligence community, this study clarifies the direction of U.S. strategic intelligence work and comprehends American perceptions of global security threats, thereby providing reference points for China's national security efforts. **[Method/Process]** Employing textual analysis and summarization methods, the report content is dissected and interpreted, revealing that the U.S. intelligence community attaches particular importance to key issues including "international competition," "non-traditional security," "transnational challenges," and "regional conflicts." **[Result/Conclusion]** Synthesizing the above analysis with recent trends in U.S. global security strategy, this paper concludes that China's national security work should be guided by the Overall National Security Concept, adopt a forward-looking perspective to prevent and mitigate potential risks both domestic and foreign, and resolutely safeguard national security.

Keywords: strategic intelligence; U.S. intelligence community; Overall National Security Concept; national security

Introduction

Against the backdrop of unprecedented global changes not seen in a century, the "great power game" between China and the United States has intensified, placing China's national security in a period of concentrated contradictions and multiplying risks. Building the Overall National Security Concept and safeguarding national security constitute a long-term strategic task. On November 18, 2021, the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee convened a meeting to review the *National Security Strategy (2021-2025)*, where General Secretary Xi Jinping once again emphasized the significance of constructing the Overall National Security Concept under new circumstances, elevating national security to a strategic position concerning core national interests. Safeguarding national security has become the primary mission of China's strategic intelligence work [1]. On March 8, 2023, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence formally submitted the 2023 *Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community* (hereinafter referred to as "the Report") to Congress [2]. As the intelligence community's annual routine publication, the Report continues the structural tradition of previous years, serving U.S. national security strategy as its starting point and objective. It assesses global security threats and challenges that the United States may face in 2023 from both macro and micro perspectives, reflecting recent priorities and directions in American intelligence work. In this context, analyzing and interpreting the latest annual report from the U.S. intelligence community holds significant importance for understanding and grasping the global strategic layout of U.S. intelligence work and enhancing the forward-looking nature of China's national security intelligence efforts.

1. Key Assessment Areas of the Report

1.1 Assessment of International Competition Threats

Regarding international competition threat assessment, the Report focuses on conflicts of interest and competitive relationships between the United States and countries such as China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran in the international arena, identifying China and Russia as the primary “threats” in global competition. First, the Report explicitly states that risks, challenges, and threats to U.S. military strength are increasing. On one hand, China is pursuing the goal of building a world-class military with continuously improving capabilities designed to offset American military advantages. On the other hand, China and Russia maintain close cooperation in arms sales, joint military exercises, and diplomacy, driven by their “shared threat perception” of the United States. Combined with the escalation of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and U.S. conflicts of interest with Iran and North Korea in the Middle East and on the Korean Peninsula, these factors continuously increase American military pressure. Second, in terms of global influence, the Report considers Russia among the greatest threats to U.S. global influence, alleging that Russia employs its intelligence agencies, proxies, and extensive influence tools to divide Western alliances, create discord within the United States, influence American voters and decision-making, and weaken U.S. global standing to expand its own influence worldwide. Finally, concerning core technologies, the Report identifies China as America’s most potential competitor, falsely accusing China of being the most extensive, active, and persistent state conducting cyber covert operations against U.S. government and private sectors. It maligns China for continuously employing secret means to steal American technological and digital information to achieve independent innovation and self-sufficiency. The Report also claims that countries like Iran and North Korea are developing cyber capabilities for covert operations, posing grave threats to the cyber and digital security of the United States and its allies. In response, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) National Cybersecurity Protection System (NCPS) is strengthening protection of American cyber systems [3].

1.2 Assessment of Non-Traditional Security Threats

Continuing previous years’ focus, this year’s Report maintains attention on non-traditional security issues including climate and environmental change, health security, and biosecurity []. The Report argues that climate change will continuously exacerbate risks to U.S. national security interests while intensifying geopolitical tensions surrounding global climate challenges. Extreme heat, population pressures, and changing rainfall patterns resulting from climate change will negatively impact agriculture and food security in many regions worldwide, increasing the risk of competitive conflicts among nations over water resources, arable land, and even natural resources in the Arctic. For low-income countries particularly, climate and environmental changes will deepen economic challenges, weaken their capacity to supply basic social needs, and potentially in-

crease domestic protests, social instability, and extremist activities. Regarding health security, the Report notes that the lack of “global on-site biosafety standards and protective measures” continues to raise concerns about global virus spread. Although the COVID-19 pandemic has been effectively controlled, the drivers of disease emergence persist and are increasing. Countries worldwide remain vulnerable to the emergence or introduction of new pathogens that could cause devastating global pandemics. If such pathogens spread to agricultural and livestock sectors, they could cause enormous economic losses and disrupt food supplies, thereby increasing risks to social governance and political stability in some nations. In the biosecurity domain, the Report focuses on biological weapons development, warning that with the rapid advancement of dual-use technologies including bioinformatics, synthetic biology, nanotechnology, and genome editing, the development and utilization of novel biological weapons becomes more feasible, while detection, attribution, and treatment of such weapons become more complex.

1.3 Assessment of “Transnational Issues” Threats

The Report explicitly states that certain transnational challenges pose direct threats to U.S. interests, including rapid technological development, transnational organized crime, international terrorism, and the social impacts of international migration. With the development of information technology, the United States believes that breakthroughs by some countries in semiconductors and high-performance computing will seriously threaten American strategic advantages in the technology sector. For example, China already possesses 173 of the world’s most powerful supercomputers, one-third more than the 128 supercomputers in the United States. Additionally, transnational organized crimes including illegal drug production and trafficking, human trafficking, smuggling, money laundering, and financial crimes are undermining the integrity of the international financial system, threatening public safety in the United States and its allies, and eroding democratic rule of law in partner countries. Regarding international terrorism, the Report concludes that U.S. citizens and interests worldwide will continue to face increasingly diverse threats from terrorism. Individuals or groups adhering to ISIS, al-Qaeda, or other international extremist violent organizations will pose significant terrorist threats to American personnel, facilities, and interests. The “Lebanese Hezbollah” terrorist organization is particularly committed to planning terrorist attacks and has continuously sought opportunities to conduct such attacks on U.S. soil. Globally, the number of people displaced from their home countries due to regional conflicts, violent activities, and natural disasters is increasing. Such large-scale migration will increasingly deteriorate the socioeconomic and security conditions of recipient countries. Meanwhile, the growing gap between humanitarian needs and international financial assistance may also exacerbate migration flows. According to scientific predictions, drought-affected regions in the Horn of Africa and South America with below-average rainfall levels, as well as other areas potentially experiencing flooding in the coming year, could lead to additional migration

incidents.

1.4 Assessment of Regional Conflict Threats

Regarding regional conflict threat assessment, the Report maintains that today's world security situation is complex and volatile, with regional conflicts, instability factors between certain countries, and other governance challenges posing direct or indirect threats to U.S. and allied interests. Potential risks in the border dispute between China and India could prompt both countries to expand their military postures, increasing the risk of armed confrontation between these two major powers, which could directly threaten U.S. interests in the region. The crisis between India and Pakistan is more concerning, as these two nuclear-armed nations face the possibility of escalation over the Kashmir conflict, with both sides' perceptions of escalating tensions increasing conflict risks. Potential instability in Iraq's new government, violent conflicts between Myanmar's military junta and democratic opposition, Ethiopia's domestic conflict in East Africa, and increasingly severe rebellions in the Democratic Republic of Congo—all these events, whether violent incidents or prolonged civil wars, may erode governance institutions, deepen internal divisions, consume national resources, and challenge the ability of the United States and its allies to cooperate effectively with these countries. In West Africa, influenced by multiple destabilizing factors including democratic backsliding, terrorism expansion, and state inability to provide security guarantees, the region's security and stability situation will become more severe. Furthermore, differing views among European governments on key policies have hindered deeper political and economic integration within the EU and have caused some transatlantic trade tensions.

2. Characteristics of the Report's Assessment Content

2.1 Dynamic and Comprehensive Nature of Threat Assessments

Following the 9/11 attacks, the United States profoundly comprehended the painful lessons of this sudden incident, regarding it as one of two major intelligence failures alongside the Pearl Harbor attack, which directly drove reforms and reorganization of the U.S. intelligence community. Since 2006, the reorganized intelligence community has issued an annual "Global Threat Assessment" at the beginning of each year to provide decision-making support and reference for U.S. national security work. Examining the focus areas of successive reports reveals that the U.S. intelligence community's perception of primary security threats has undergone four historic shifts: from "terrorism" to "economic security," then to "cybersecurity," and finally to "China" [4]. This transformation in threat perception highlights America's increasingly severe Cold War mentality, gradually shifting focus from domestic traditional security threats to foreign competitors and attributing almost all domestic security threats to foreign influence [5]. Second, examining the content of these assessments, the annual U.S. intelligence threat evaluations cover extremely broad topics and have formed a relatively complete intelligence assessment system, addressing both traditional

security issues such as military, political, and diplomatic conflicts, as well as non-traditional security domains including climate and environment, terrorism, biology, and cyberspace. In recent years, as U.S.-Iran tensions have continuously escalated, the U.S. government's "New Africa Strategy" has advanced rapidly, and concerns about China's development and growth have intensified, the Report has formed a global assessment system centered on the Middle East, Africa, and East Asia, covering four additional regions: South Asia, Eurasia, Europe, and Latin America.

2.2 Threat Assessment Serving Great Power Competition

The U.S. intelligence community believes that in the coming years, the United States and its allies will face a complex and critical international security environment, where the rise of major powers will pose serious challenges to American dominance in the global order and compete to establish the conditions and rules of this new order for decades to come. Therefore, U.S. intelligence agencies consider it crucial to serve the U.S. government in its strategic competition with China and Russia over what shape the world will take. In October 2020, the United States released the *National Counterintelligence Strategy 2020-2022*, which identified Russia and China as posing severe threats to U.S. economic, supply chain, and technological security, concluding that American national security interests face "unprecedented foreign intelligence threats." The strategy proposed three intelligence mission objectives: protecting critical U.S. infrastructure, reducing threats from foreign competitors to American supply chains, and countering exploitation of the U.S. economy [6]. The 2023 *Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community* once again lists China and Russia as priority focus areas, comprehensively evaluating conflicts of interest and competitive relationships with both countries across multiple domains. It identifies China as America's most threatening competitor, alleging that China is breaking U.S. global strategic advantages across economic, military, and technological dimensions to engage in comprehensive strategic competition with the United States. Against this international backdrop, the U.S. intelligence community increasingly views intelligence work as an important decision-making tool for conducting global strategic competition with China and Russia, thereby enabling the United States to maintain strategic priority in increasingly fierce global competition.

2.3 U.S. Intelligence Perspective Gradually Shifting Toward Africa

For a long time, the U.S. government has faced domestic criticism for lacking a clear Africa strategy. Particularly following the rapid development of China-Africa economic and trade cooperation—after China surpassed the United States as Africa's largest trading partner in 2009—American political circles began to realize that the United States must accelerate its strategic deployment in Africa and strengthen protection of U.S. interests there. In December 2018, the Trump administration announced a "New Africa Strategy" to guide U.S. strategic com-

petition with China and Russia in Africa and advance various U.S. strategic deployments on the continent [7]. Under this strategic framework, the Report conducts risk assessments of U.S. political, economic, and regional security interests in Africa. The U.S. intelligence community believes that Africa's security situation will become more complex and severe in the future, with regional conflicts, economic problems, and extremist terrorism intertwining to affect the advancement of various U.S. strategic measures in Africa. In February 2020, the U.S. Department of Defense decided to dispatch Army security forces composed of officers, instructors, and military advisors to Africa, claiming their main purpose was "supporting local security operations, developing partner nations' security maintenance capabilities, and achieving regional security favorable to U.S. national interests," while actually concealing intentions to continuously expand American influence in Africa [8]. Following the Trump administration, the Biden administration has continued the "great power competition" strategy, viewing Africa as a strategic arena for international competition with China and Russia, and actively developing allies and strengthening cooperation with various African nations. The Biden administration believes this approach can not only expand U.S. sphere of influence in Africa but also divert domestic contradictions, promote American economic recovery, and help the United States gain advantages in future U.S.-China strategic competition.

2.4 Non-Traditional Security as a Key U.S. Focus

This year's Report places particular emphasis on assessing threats and challenges to U.S. interests from non-traditional security issues. The U.S. intelligence community believes that the intertwining of traditional and non-traditional security will increasingly threaten American and allied global interests, especially non-traditional security problems such as international terrorism, transnational organized crime, cybersecurity, ecological security, and anomalous health events. In 2022, the Biden administration's latest *National Security Strategy* identified "common challenges posed by global issues" as one of two major challenges facing the United States today, with "global issues" primarily referring to non-traditional security problems arising from terrorist attacks, cybersecurity incidents, and migration activities [9]. In April 2023, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security released the *Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR)*, which reiterated five fundamental missions for strengthening non-traditional security domains: "counter terrorism and prevent terror threats," "secure and manage our borders," "administer the nation's immigration system," "protect cyberspace and critical infrastructure," and "build a resilient nation and respond to incidents" [10]. Additionally, within the American education system, Cornell University, Syracuse University's Maxwell School, the London School of Economics, and the U.S. National Defense University (funded by the Department of Defense) have all launched research programs on non-traditional security [11]. Throughout the U.S. security system—whether in the intelligence community's annual threat assessments, the quadrennial homeland security reviews, or American educational institutions—comprehensive and in-depth research on

non-traditional security domains demonstrates the U.S. government's concerns and vigilance regarding these issues.

2.5 U.S. Cyber and Digital Information Protection Initiatives

Compared with previous years, this year's Report includes a new chapter on digital information security threat assessment. The U.S. intelligence community believes that globally, malicious foreign use of digital information and communication technologies will become more widespread, sophisticated, and targeted in the coming years. For example, the Report notes that many foreign governments have become proficient in using digital information tools, including commercial spyware and surveillance technologies, which could further distort publicly available information, illegally exploit sensitive data of U.S. citizens, attempt to influence American public opinion about their regimes, affect voter perspectives and preferences, and create social and political turmoil, thereby threatening overall U.S. interests. In April 2023, U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security Mayorkas stated that "approximately 1.4 billion devices in the United States are connected as part of the Internet of Things, from our home thermostats and doorbells to our power grids and fuel pipelines. While this brings tremendous convenience to our lives, it also multiplies the risk of harm to us through the digital world, whether through cyberattacks, abuse of our trade and travel systems, or disinformation campaigns attempting to undermine our democratic institutions" [12]. To strengthen U.S. cyber and digital information protection, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), pursuant to President Biden's Executive Order 14028 on improving national cybersecurity, established the Cyber Safety Review Board (CSRB) to review and assess major cybersecurity incidents, enabling government and society to better protect American networks and infrastructure [13].

3. Implications for China's National Security Strategy

3.1 Upholding the Overall National Security Concept and Following the Path of National Security with Chinese Characteristics

On April 15, 2014, General Secretary Xi Jinping creatively proposed the concept of the Overall National Security Concept at the first meeting of the National Security Commission to address complex national security situations and enhance the capacity to respond to risks and challenges. The current international security situation is complex and volatile, with risk factors facing China increasing annually. Therefore, under the guidance of Marxist thought and the Party's unified leadership, China must resolutely implement the Overall National Security Concept to properly address increasingly complex domestic and international security situations. At the 20th Party Congress, General Secretary Xi Jinping emphasized that "in today's world, the interconnectedness, transnational nature, and diversity of security issues have become more prominent. China's national security is inseparable from the broader international security landscape. We must not only do our own national security work well

but also promote international security. To build a new security architecture, we must proceed from the basic principles of Marxist national security theory such as ‘indivisible security’ and a security community, abandon outdated concepts such as ‘a strong country must seek hegemony,’ zero-sum games, absolute security, and alliance-based confrontation, and promote the building of a community with a shared future for mankind” [14]. The spirit of the 20th Party Congress has further innovated and developed Marxist national security theory and enriched and expanded the path of national security with Chinese characteristics in the new era. As analyzed in the aforementioned 2023 *Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community*, the global security situation remains concerning, with traditional security threats increasingly intertwining with non-traditional security issues such as terrorism, biosecurity, cybersecurity, and health emergencies. In today’s era of a community with a shared future for mankind, these intertwined security threats not only affect U.S. security interests but also pose serious threats to the security environment of all nations worldwide. Therefore, against the backdrop of an increasingly complex international security environment, China must thoroughly study the directives and spirit of the 20th Party Congress regarding national security, actively build the Overall National Security Concept, adhere to the path of national security with Chinese characteristics, and resolutely and forcefully safeguard China’s national security.

3.2 Strengthening Regional Non-Traditional Security Cooperation and Creating New Horizons for National Security Work

The 9/11 attacks reshaped global understanding of terrorist threats. Subsequent major global disasters including the “global financial crisis,” “Antarctic glacier melting,” and “COVID-19 pandemic” have heightened international concerns about non-traditional security issues. Following the 9/11 incident, China first mentioned the term “non-traditional security” in government documents, emphasizing that the intertwined threats of traditional and non-traditional security have become common challenges facing all humanity. This expansion from “traditional” to “non-traditional” has become a defining characteristic of global security situations since the turn of the twenty-first century [15]. Surveying the global security landscape, non-traditional security issues such as climate and environmental change, financial crises, cybercrime, biosecurity, and polar regions all concern the future and destiny of all mankind, and no country can remain insulated. In January 2017, the State Council Information Office issued the white paper *China’s Policies on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation*, which introduced China’s participation in regional non-traditional security cooperation, including actively promoting Asia-Pacific disaster relief exchanges and cooperation, conducting counter-terrorism and anti-smuggling operations with multiple neighboring countries, cooperating with the United Nations and other international and regional organizations to combat transnational organized crime, and engaging in maritime security, scientific research, and environmental protection exchanges with ASEAN countries [16]. In May 2023, the China-Central Asia

Summit saw Central Asian countries highly evaluate and express willingness to actively implement the Global Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative, and Global Civilization Initiative proposed by China [17]. These series of international security cooperation efforts undertaken by China in the international community have not only enhanced China's governance capacity and experience in addressing non-traditional security issues but also contributed to improving the overall regional security environment. This is of great significance for advancing China's national security work, coordinating development and security, and satisfying the people's growing needs for security, happiness, and fulfillment.

3.3 Practicing Multilateralism and Strengthening International Cooperation to Properly Address “Great Power Games”

As China's comprehensive national strength continues to grow, the United States has gradually come to view China as the world's most threatening competitor. The 2017 Trump administration's *National Security Strategy* identified China as a long-term competitor to the United States in political, economic, and security interests [18]. In 2022, the Biden administration issued its first *National Security Strategy*, defining China as “the most important geopolitical challenge” and prioritizing international competition with China as a national strategic priority, introducing the new concept of “outmaneuvering” in its preface [9]. The 2023 *Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community* mentions the keyword “China” 58 times across military, political, economic, technological, and cultural domains. American unilateralism, hegemonism, and power politics continue to rise, with “Cold War thinking” becoming increasingly evident. The “great power game” between China and the United States has become comprehensive and long-term. To properly address this increasingly fierce “great power competition” and break U.S. “unilateral hegemony” policies, practicing multilateralism and strengthening international cooperation are particularly crucial. In February 2023, China's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Zhang Jun, stated at a UN briefing that “the UN should firmly grasp the direction of genuine multilateralism, uphold the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, clearly oppose unilateralism, hegemonism, and bullying, and safeguard international fairness and justice. Some countries are keen to incite bloc confrontation and seek decoupling and chain-breaking, which will only push the world toward division. Suppressing enterprises of other countries and containing their technological development is hindering human progress. The international community must resolutely say ‘no’ to these behaviors” [19]. In May 2023, when meeting with visiting Russian Prime Minister Mishustin, President Xi Jinping stated that “China is willing to continue mutual firm support with Russia on issues concerning each other's core interests, strengthen cooperation on multilateral stages such as the United Nations, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, BRICS, and G20. Both sides should continue to tap potential, enhance the level of economic, trade, and investment cooperation, improve bilateral cooperation mechanisms, consolidate and expand cooperation fundamentals in energy

and connectivity, and create more new growth points” [20]. Facing unfair and asymmetric international competition, only by practicing multilateralism and strengthening international cooperation can we properly address problems arising from “great power competition” and eliminate various security hazards in national development.

3.4 Strengthening Protection of Overseas Interests and Building a China-Africa Community with a Shared Future

Since the establishment of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in 2000, China-Africa economic and trade cooperation has achieved leapfrog development. By the end of 2020, China’s investment in Africa exceeded \$43.4 billion, covering more than 50 African countries. Since 2009, China has been Africa’s largest trading partner for 13 consecutive years [21]. However, Africa’s security situation is relatively complex, with persistent problems including inter-state conflicts, terrorism, drug trafficking, and illegal immigration plaguing the region. In 2021, the African continent experienced over 13,000 protests and riots, resulting in 1,200 deaths. Between 2020 and 2022, West Africa witnessed seven military coups, exceeding the total number of coups during the entire 2010-2020 period [22]. In March 2023, an armed attack targeting a Chinese private enterprise in the Central African Republic killed nine Chinese citizens and seriously injured two others. General Secretary Xi Jinping attached great importance to this incident and issued important instructions demanding all-out efforts to treat the injured, properly handle aftermath, punish the perpetrators according to law, and ensure the safety of Chinese citizens [23]. Various security incidents in Africa not only deteriorate the overall security situation on the continent but also create serious security risks for Chinese investment and personnel in Africa. Moreover, the United States increasingly views Africa as a battlefield for “great power games” with China. From the Trump administration to the current Biden administration, U.S. Africa strategies have been designed and implemented against the backdrop of increasingly fierce U.S.-China competition. Under this policy-driven approach, in March 2020, the U.S. Export-Import Bank (EXIM) established the “China Competition Committee,” which provides specialized recommendations to the bank on how to conduct strategic competition with China and enhance U.S. economic and trade influence in Africa [24]. Facing Africa’s unstable internal security situation and the United States’ tough competitive posture toward China in Africa, China must adhere to the Overall National Security Concept, coordinate internal and external security, strengthen protection of overseas Chinese personnel and interests, actively build a China-Africa community with a shared future, and properly address various future insecurity factors. In September 2015, President Xi Jinping announced the establishment of the “China-UN Peace and Development Fund,” which focuses on supporting African peacekeeping, counter-terrorism, and sustainable development. To date, it has launched 34 Africa-related projects, becoming a new platform for trilateral cooperation among China, Africa, and the United Nations. On the path toward African peace and development, China will continue

to stand firmly with Africa, advancing hand in hand [25].

3.5 Resolving Contradictions Through Communication and Dialogue to Safeguard China's Border Security

Since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war, international society has expressed widespread concern about global security. However, as an “outsider” to the conflict, the United States has shown extraordinary attention to this regional conflict. The 2023 *Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community* evaluates the impact of the Russia-Ukraine war and other regional conflicts on U.S. global strategic interests from multiple perspectives, extending this analysis to the China-India border issue. Prior to this, in June 2020, China and India experienced a sudden incident in the Galwan Valley border area, resulting in five Chinese casualties. Subsequently, both countries conducted multiple rounds of negotiations on border issues, finally reaching a consensus in September 2020 that “neither side should take any provocative actions to avoid further escalation” [26]. As important neighbors, both China and India are emerging economic powers and important components of the BRICS countries, while maintaining cooperation within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization framework. The two countries’ joint efforts to strengthen communication and dialogue and properly resolve border issues are of great significance for promoting healthy and friendly bilateral development. In March 2022, Chinese and Indian militaries held the 15th round of corps commander-level talks to discuss continued progress in resolving issues in the western section of the border. These talks were positive and constructive. Both sides reaffirmed that resolving remaining issues would help restore peace and tranquility in the western border areas and promote bilateral relations. They agreed to continue maintaining security and stability on the front lines, keep dialogue channels open through military and diplomatic means, and reach mutually acceptable solutions as soon as possible [27].

3.6 Accelerating Core Technology Breakthroughs and Achieving High-Level Scientific and Technological Self-Reliance

As China’s high-tech sector develops rapidly, both American political circles and intelligence agencies widely believe that China’s breakthroughs in emerging technologies are threatening U.S. global technological hegemony. The Biden administration considers “strategic competition” between China and the United States in emerging technology fields unavoidable. On one hand, the U.S. government continuously strengthens protection in areas such as cyber technology and digital information; on the other hand, it calls on partner nations to jointly suppress China’s development in high-tech fields, including 5G technology, next-generation communications, quantum computing, nanotechnology, computer hardware, network technology, and other emerging technologies [28]. Against the backdrop of increasingly fierce U.S.-China great power games, China’s high-tech sector development will continue to face considerable pressure for some

time. In response, China should continuously strengthen independent innovation capabilities in science and technology, enhance policy support, increase capital investment and talent cultivation, and accelerate breakthroughs in critical core technologies to resolve “bottleneck” issues and safeguard China’s technological security. In May 2023, the Institute of Party History and Literature of the CPC Central Committee compiled and published *Xi Jinping on Self-Reliance and Strength in Science and Technology* through the Central Party Literature Press. This collection of important discourses by Comrade Xi Jinping on advancing scientific and technological self-reliance systematically elaborates on the strategic objectives, key tasks, major measures, and basic requirements of China’s scientific and technological innovation, proposing a series of new ideas, viewpoints, judgments, and requirements that provide important guidance for accelerating the construction of a strong science and technology nation and achieving high-level scientific and technological self-reliance [29].

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Note: Figure translations are in progress. See original paper for figures.

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