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Authors: Zhang Wei, Guo Benyu, Zhang Lei, Zhang Lei

Date: 2021-10-07T00:00:00+00:00

Abstract

Intersubjective theory represents one of the most significant orientations within contemporary psychoanalysis. In contrast to more traditional psychoanalytic approaches, its theoretical features are characterized by a shift from distinguishing between "inner/outer" space to emphasizing the "in-between" space, from a "subject-object" relationship to a "subject-subject" relationship, from insight to action, and from foundationalism and positivism to hermeneutics and constructivism. Despite terminological confusion and divergent viewpoints, the intersubjective turn in psychoanalysis has permeated virtually all schools of thought, exerting widespread influence on numerous analysts across North America, Europe, and Latin America. Future intersubjective theory must maintain an open stance, continuously engaging in dialogue with prior theories, clinical material, and other disciplinary domains.

Full Text

The Intersubjective Turn in Psychoanalysis: Theoretical Features and Divergences

Guo Benyu[2]
([1] Research Center for Psychological Science and Health, China University of Geosciences (Wuhan), Wuhan 430074, China)
Zhang Lei[3,2]*
Zhang Wei[1,2]
([2] School of Psychology, Nanjing Normal University, Nanjing 210097, China)
([3] School of Early Childhood Education, Nanjing Xiaozhuang University, Nanjing 211171, China)

Abstract: Intersubjective theory is one of the most important orientations in contemporary psychoanalysis. Compared with more traditional psychoanalysis, its theoretical characteristics manifest as a shift from distinguishing "in-

side/outside" space to emphasizing "in-between" space, from "subject-object" relationships to "subject-subject" relationships, from insight to action, and from foundationalism and positivism to hermeneutics and constructivism. Despite terminological confusion and divergent viewpoints, the intersubjective turn has spread to nearly every psychoanalytic school and has widely influenced numerous analysts in North America, Europe, and Latin America. Future intersubjective theory needs to maintain an open attitude and engage in continuous dialogue with previous theories, clinical materials, and other disciplinary fields.

Keywords: psychoanalysis, intersubjectivity, two-person psychology, dialogical self, the third, relational perspective

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When discussing contemporary psychoanalytic theory and practice, intersubjectivity inevitably becomes an unavoidable topic. This is reflected in the statements of many analysts. For example, Spezzano (2012) believes that all analysts have become more aware of the intersubjective dimension of their work. Kirshner (2017) expresses a similar view: "Despite the confusion in terminology, 'intersubjectivity' has become a kind of 'jargon' in contemporary psychoanalysis" (p. 50). Bohleber (2013) is even more direct, stating that "over the past two or three decades, almost all schools of psychoanalytic thought have undergone a shift toward a more intense intersubjective orientation" (p. 799).

The "trendiness" of intersubjective theory can be seen in the publication patterns within the psychoanalytic field. This paper examines the usage of the term "intersubjectivity" in psychoanalytic journals by searching the PEP archive (Psychoanalytic Electronic Publishing archive), the largest database in the field. The results show that intersubjectivity appeared only 3 times between 1940–1959; this number increased to 20 between 1960–1979; it involved 1,000 documents between 1980–1999; and reached 2,857 between 2000–2019. In contrast, most psychoanalytic journals are bimonthly or quarterly, with annual publication volumes typically ranging from 20–60 articles (see Table 1). This further highlights the "heat" of intersubjective theory. Notably, several important psychoanalytic journals have published special issues around the theme of "intersubjectivity." For instance, between 2000–2003, Gerhardt and colleagues conducted a special study titled "The Intersubjective Turn in Psychoanalysis: A Comparison of Contemporary Theorists" in *Psychoanalytic Dialogues*. This study was published in three parts, introducing the main theoretical perspectives of Jessica Benjamin, Christopher Bollas, and Darlene B. Ehrenberg (Gerhardt et al., 2000, 2003; Gerhardt & Sweetnam, 2001). Between 2012–2013, the *International Forum of Psychoanalysis* published five consecutive special issues discussing intersubjective psychoanalysis from perspectives including "theoretical perspectives," "clinical perspectives," "neuro-psychoanalytic perspectives," "historical precursors and developments," and "maternal holding, body, and madness" (see Kyriazis et al., 2012, 2013). In addition to journal articles, several important monographs and edited volumes have provided systematic reviews of "intersubjectivity," such as *Relational and Intersubjective Perspectives in Psychoanalysis: A Cri-*

tique (Mills, 2005), *Destructiveness, Intersubjectivity and Trauma: The Identity Crisis of Modern Psychoanalysis* (Bohleber, 2010), and *Intersubjectivity in Psychoanalysis: A Model for Theory and Practice* (Kirshner, 2017).

Behind this publication "heat" lies a significant growth in the number of researchers. Within the intersubjective orientation, many representative researchers can be identified, such as Robert D. Stolorow, George E. Atwood, Donna M. Orange, Lewis Aron, Jessica Benjamin, Thomas H. Ogden, the Boston Change Process Study Group (BCPSG), Beatrice Beebe, Alexander C. Morgan, Jeremy P. Nahum, Bruce Reis, Louis W. Sander, and Daniel N. Stern. The list is so extensive that it is impossible to provide a comprehensive inventory (Schwartz, 2012). Therefore, it can be said that the intersubjective orientation in psychoanalysis is being carried out "in full swing."

2 The Basic Connotation of Intersubjective Psychoanalysis

What, then, is intersubjective psychoanalysis? Let us first examine the term "intersubjectivity." In fact, this term is difficult to define precisely (Bohleber, 2013; Kirshner, 2017; Mills, 2005). It originates from philosophy, embedded in the thought of German classical philosophers such as Johann Fichte and Georg Hegel (Frie & Reis, 2001), and is repeatedly mentioned by phenomenologists including Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (Schwartz, 2012; Thompson, 2005). Moreover, different theorists employ the term in different ways. Wang Xiaodong (2004) comprehensively summarizes the forms of intersubjectivity theory in Western philosophy (see Table 2) and provides a relatively broad definition: "Intersubjectivity refers to the correlation and connection between a person as a subject and others in the process of objectified activity," involving "aspects and dimensions of human beings as cognitive subjects, existential subjects, ethical subjects, practical subjects⋯" It is related to "people' s subjective and conscious worlds, lifeworlds and practical worlds, as well as value and ideal worlds," influences people' s actual and possible lives, and encompasses "relationships between individual and subject, group and group, and individual and group or species (humanity as a whole)" (p. 22). In short, the interactive existence of human beings as subjects with other subjects has multiple dimensions, creating the complexity and diversity of what lies "between" subjects.

Influenced by philosophy (and fields such as infant research), various analysts differ in their terminology when applying intersubjectivity to psychoanalytic theory and practice, thus creating different "orientations" of intersubjective psychoanalysis. On this point, we can attempt to distinguish between narrow and broad definitions of intersubjectivity. In the narrow sense, intersubjectivity primarily refers to a developmental achievement involving the ability to share experiences with others and to recognize others and oneself (Teicholz, 2015). For example, for Aron, a person with intersubjective capacity can switch between the roles of observer and observed, understanding that everyone possesses the dual characteristics of subject and object (Aron, 1996). For Benjamin, intersubjectivity

means mutual recognition, through which the individual can understand that the other is a subject relatively independent of oneself, with their own unique inner world and perspective (Benjamin, 2016, 2018). Stern (and his BCPSG) views intersubjectivity as the ability to share, know, feel, participate in, and enter into the subjective experience of others, realized through the interpretation of public behaviors such as posture, facial expressions, tone of voice, speech rhythm, and verbal content (Stern, 2005). This can be further divided into primary intersubjectivity and secondary intersubjectivity. The former involves only the sharing of experience between two subjects, while the latter involves a third thing or event beyond the two subjects (Trevarthen & Aitken, 2001). In the broad sense, intersubjectivity can refer generally to interpersonal interaction (Teicholz, 2015): under the inseparable interaction of two subjects (such as analyst and patient, mother and infant), they may create many rich "things" that are even difficult to express in language or concepts. Buirski (2005) and Jaenicke (2011) describe this as "colliding worlds of experience." Major proponents of this view include Stolorow and his collaborators (Orange et al., 1997; Stolorow & Atwood, 1992), Beebe and Lachmann (Beebe & Lachmann, 2002), and others.

Here it is also necessary to distinguish intersubjective psychoanalysis from relational psychoanalysis. These two terms have many similarities and overlapping aspects, and it seems that in the postmodern context, the boundaries between them have become blurred and less distinct (Ding, 2016). For example, Benjamin considers herself a relational analyst who uses the theoretical "category" of intersubjectivity (Schwartz, 2012). Some researchers even combine the two, calling it the relational-intersubjective approach (Ringstrom, 2012; Seligman, 2018) or the relational-intersubjective perspective (Arnd-Caddigan, 2013; Cohen & Schermer, 2004). On this point, Schwartz' s comparison serves as an excellent reference. In his view, intersubjective psychoanalysis is best defined as a theoretical orientation, whereas relational psychoanalysis is first defined as a community of analysts with political and social connections, and only secondarily as a theoretical orientation. This can be elaborated from two main aspects. First, relational psychoanalysis is a movement: it has its own institution (the New York University Postdoctoral Program in Psychotherapy and Psychoanalysis), official journal (*Psychoanalytic Dialogues*), international organization (The International Association for Relational Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy), and numerous related conferences. In contrast, intersubjective theory lacks such infrastructure; it is more a collection of views from many independently working theorists, without a series of structures to define its identity. Second, historically speaking, relational psychoanalysis began with Greenberg and Mitchell' s 1983 publication *Object Relations in Psychoanalytic Theory* and was formally established with the postdoctoral program at New York University in 1988. If we trace further back, Greenberg and Mitchell regarded Harry S. Sullivan and William R. D. Fairbairn as the first generation of relational theorists (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983), while Aron 更倾向于视费伦茨倾向于 viewing Sándor Ferenczi and Otto Rank as pioneers (Aron, 1996). In comparison,

the origins of intersubjective psychoanalysis are less precise, lacking a recognized foundational publication; its theoretical views must be seen as gradually emerging from a series of branches. However, the differences between the two are mainly historical and institutional rather than theoretical. From different perspectives, intersubjective theory can be seen as a type of relational theory, and vice versa. Therefore, intersubjective theory can be viewed as the broader term encompassing relational theory (Schwartz, 2012). This paper endorses this position, viewing the orientation of "intersubjective psychoanalysis" in a broad sense. As Levine and Friedman (2000) and Kirshner (2017) point out, intersubjectivity is not attached to any particular psychoanalytic school. In other words, as long as an analyst takes "intersubjectivity" as the foundation of their theory or practice, regardless of how they understand or use the term, they can be considered part of this orientation.

3 Theoretical Features of Intersubjective Psychoanalysis

Despite theoretical divergences and terminological confusion, we can attempt to summarize the theoretical features of the intersubjective orientation. One perspective examines the distinction between one-person psychology and two-person psychology. This division is not simply a matter of numbers but is based on the starting point of theoretical construction. Simply put, one-person psychology is grounded in the intrapsychic dimension, focusing on the individual mind; two-person psychology begins from the interpersonal or intersubjective dimension, exploring the self-other relational matrix. In this sense, intersubjective psychoanalysis (along with relational psychoanalysis) represents a relatively complete two-person psychology. In contrast, classical psychoanalysis can be seen as the paradigm of one-person psychology. In addition to these two, other important forms of psychoanalysis, such as object relations theory, self psychology, and interpersonal psychoanalysis, possess characteristics of both one-person and two-person psychology, differing only in degree, and are thus considered incomplete two-person psychologies (see Ding, 2016). Some researchers even refer to self psychology as "one and a half person psychology" (Harris et al., 2019) and Bion's object relations model as "one-and-one-half-person psychoanalysis" (Seligman, 2018). This paper refers to orientations such as object relations theory, self psychology, and interpersonal psychoanalysis as transitional forms, emphasizing their transitional nature in the intersubjective turn, while regarding ego psychology, which primarily continues classical psychoanalysis, as one-person psychology.

Another perspective distinguishes between the monological self and the dialogical self, drawing on Muller' s (2016) insightful summary. In his view, this pair of concepts is more appropriate than the distinctions between one-person and two-person psychology, intrapsychic and intersubjective perspectives, or drive model and relational model. The reason is that the dialogical concept of the self is broader than the dialogue between analyst and patient, making it more suitable for comparing these different orientations. What, then, are the monological

self and the dialogical self? Here, Muller follows Taylor' s (1991) distinction: the monological self is a single agent that typically performs monological acts. However, such agents can also engage in certain forms of cooperation or collaboration, such as two soccer players participating in an attack together, with one sprinting forward and the other passing the ball from midfield. In contrast, the dialogical self involves dialogical acts, which require the presence of two or more agents whose cooperation must proceed according to a shared rhythm, such as dancing partners or two debaters engaged in intense argument (Muller, 2016).

The concept of the monological self is rooted in the thought of Descartes and Locke and includes four main features (Taylor, 1991): First, representation plays a primary role. Specifically, the self, as an independently existing entity, has an internal space where it can represent the world and others, as well as its own body, goals, and desires. Representation grounds individual thinking and subsequently influences (or even determines) the individual' s interactions with itself and others. Second, the mind exists independently of the environment; mental activity occurs within an enclosed brain that contains all the departments needed for the former. Third, since all "beings" outside the self are objects of representation, the individual' s relationship with the world and with others is a "subject-object" relationship. In this sense, others exist merely as representations in the individual' s mind rather than as another subject. This creates a rupture between mental, social, and bodily activities. Fourth, the primary function of language is to form representations—that is, to use concepts to describe and refer to objects in the world. On this basis, theory becomes a tool for individuals to understand and explain the world and discover "objective truth" (Muller, 2016).

In contrast, the concept of the dialogical self primarily derives from the theories of Bakhtin, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Wittgenstein, with the following main features (Taylor, 1991): First, the self is a living person situated in concrete time and space, embedded in practical activities and the world, and cannot exist apart from them. Second, the relationship between self and others is central. This contains two different meanings: one emphasizes that the sense of self arises from placing oneself before others and thus inevitably includes others. Moreover, it resides in the body as a kind of "bodily knowing." The other meaning implies that cognitive activity is an internalized social process (as represented by Vygotsky), and that our thoughts essentially depend on a "silent speaker" —that is, thinking is a dialogue between the individual and another "silent" other. Lazar (2001) describes this as "subjectivity never exists alone in the subject but always needs the other to be formed" (p. 277). Third, the self is responsive. When an individual is in dialogue, the other is a relatively independent other consciousness rather than an object within the individual' s consciousness. In a deeply developed dialogical state, both parties are fully "present," and understanding occurs in response. Fourth, language has a constitutive function. Through language, the world is revealed to us. Language is not a form of thinking external to practice but is based on these practices and derives meaning from them. This also means that theory is not a proposition

that corresponds to reality but a tool that orders experience and creates reality. In other words, we do not discover reality but construct it. Furthermore, from a hermeneutic perspective, the subject matter is a text whose meaning is uncertain, unfinished, and contradictory, requiring further interpretation. In the process of interpretation, meaning and coherence are generated. However, it should be noted that the monological and dialogical attributes of the self are neither mutually exclusive nor complementary. "The self is essentially dialogical in nature but has the capacity for monological action" (Muller, 2016, p. 937).

This paper endorses Muller's view that psychoanalysis has undergone four transformations from the monological self to the dialogical self, with further refinements and supplements to his specific arguments. These four aspects are as follows: First, from distinguishing "inside/outside" space to emphasizing "in-between" space. In Freud' s theory, the division between internal and external worlds is very clear. For example, drive, one of his core concepts, is a mental representation arising from bodily stimulation. Due to the existence of drives, the infant urgently seeks satisfaction of various needs (such as physiological and safety needs) to discover the existence of external objects like the mother' s breast, thereby gradually learning to distinguish internal from external worlds (Muller, 2016). Freud' s another important concept—identification—similarly involves a clear division: whether maintaining an erotic relationship with others or objects in fantasy, attempting to replace the external real object with an imaginary one (Freud, 1914); or through the continuous and excessive cathexis of libido onto object-related memories and expectations, enabling part of the ego to emulate and replace the object, thereby re-establishing and possessing the object within the internal world (Freud, 1915); or the child acquiring the ego ideal and conscience by identifying with and internalizing parental notions of right and wrong, thereby forming the superego within the psychic interior (Freud, 1923). Similarly, the concept of projection involves the individual "throwing" unacceptable motives or ideas (such as voyeuristic desires) onto others, claiming them as belonging to the other, thereby maintaining the "purity" of one' s own internal world (Blackman, 2004). In light of this, Lacan describes Freud' s view as "the desiring subject on one side, the world on the other" (cited in Muller, 2016, p. 944), while Stolorow and colleagues (Orange et al., 1997; Stolorow & Atwood, 1992) criticize it as a Cartesian "isolated mind."

In contrast, inspired by Winnicott' s concept of potential space, many intersubjective analysts have begun to focus on the "in-between" region of the dyad—a part that belongs neither to the infant/patient nor to the mother/analyst but is co-created by them. Representative researchers in this area include the Barangers, Antonino Ferro, Benjamin, and Ogden. For the Barangers, the interaction between analyst and patient co-creates a "bi-personal field." This field as a whole determines the participants' behaviors, thoughts, emotions, and subjectivity. Within it, bi-personal phantasy is particularly important: it is rooted in each party' s individual unconscious (including personal history and important areas of personality) yet differs from and is not simply a combination or sum of the latter; rather, it is a series of primitive fantasies created by the situation itself

(Baranger, 2012; Baranger & Baranger, 2008). Ferro draws on the Barangers' work, viewing analytic therapy as the convergence of two "subjective fields" and believing that this interaction produces a new entity. Subsequently, the concept of the bi-personal field has gradually been replaced by the intersubjective field (Bohleber, 2013). For Benjamin, the interacting parties can create an intersubjective mental space—the "third." Similar to Winnicott' s potential space, this is where both parties can contain commonality and difference, enabling better bidirectional communication and moving beyond simple complementary relationships of submission and resistance, agreement and opposition. In other words, the individual can accept the other' s perspective and understand things from that viewpoint (Benjamin, 2016, 2018). She also distinguishes various forms of the third (Benjamin, 2018), such as the shared third, the differentiating third, the rhythmic third, the moral third, the observing third, and the symbolic third. Similarly, for Ogden, the interacting parties create a third subjectivity, an independent dynamic unit of an intersubjective event—the analytic third. It is an intersubjective mixture within a specific context, emerging from the interacting parties and in turn shaping them; it limits their ability to think as separate individuals while promoting their mutual connection. The analytic third is primarily a product of unconscious interaction, involving changes in the analyst's and patient's emotions, fantasies, and bodily sensations, and may manifest as thoughts, feelings, sensations, fantasies, and behaviors (Ogden, 1994). Therefore, analysts should pay attention to their own reverie experiences, maintain openness, and tolerate directionless and purposeless experiences in analytic sessions (Ogden, 2004).

Second, from a "subject-object" relationship to a "subject-subject" relationship (Muller, 2016). Reviewing previous psychoanalytic movements, we can see that the "subject-object" relationship has long dominated: in classical psychoanalysis, the analyst is conceived as a paternal figure (Mitchell, 2000) who must frustrate the patient to facilitate insight in analysis (Mitchell & Black, 2007); in object relations theory and self psychology, the analyst plays a maternal role, providing holding, containment, and empathy (Mitchell, 2000), offering "nourishment" to the inhibited parts of the patient' s development to promote renewed "growth" (Mitchell, 2016). Although, as many analysts (Schwartz, 2012; Stern, 2005; Foresti, 2018) note, the intersubjective dimension has always been implicit in psychoanalytic work, it previously remained an "unspoken" practice lacking theoretical clarification. Overall, the analyst (and caregiver) essentially existed as a functional role, discussed in terms of satisfying or not satisfying the patient' s (and infant' s) needs, without touching upon genuine intersubjective interaction. This was only truly realized in intersubjective theory. For example, for Benjamin, children and mothers (patients and analysts) need to achieve mutual recognition to attain genuine subjectivity and agency within the relational matrix (Benjamin, 2016, 2018). Chodorow also expresses a similar view, emphasizing that it is crucial for children (and patients) to recognize and identify with the autonomy of mothers (and analysts) (Mitchell, 2000). Similarly, for Stolorow and colleagues (Orange et al., 1997; Stolorow & Atwood,

1992), Ogden (Ogden, 1994, 2004), BCPSG (2014), and Beebe and Lachmann (Beebe & Lachmann, 2002), an equal (though asymmetrical) subject-subject interaction is explicitly proposed and implemented in clinical practice. In other words, analysts need to guide patients into a "subject-subject" relationship to facilitate equal dialogue, encounter, and mutual recognition.

Third, from insight to action. In classical psychoanalysis, an important mechanism of cure is making the unconscious conscious. Here, the analyst interprets the patient' s free associations, dreams, transference, and resistance to guide the patient in lifting unconscious repression, thereby achieving insight (Muller, 2016). For many intersubjective analysts, however, interaction transcends interpretation and becomes the priority in treatment. In other words, therapy is not based on talk to achieve insight but is practiced through action. This is well captured in Delgado et al.' s (2015) statement: "The psychotherapist' s actions speak louder than words" (p. 166). From this perspective, analyst and patient interact to form an inseparable intersubjective system. In transference-countertransference enactments, both parties engage in a joint action: one acts, and the other responds with action. In this process, some of the patient' s "non-adaptive" interaction patterns can be changed directly at the interactional level, such as changing implicit relational knowing in "moments of meeting" as described by BCPSG (2014) or altering expectations through interactive regulation (especially via nonverbal communication) as described by Beebe and Lachmann (Beebe & Lachmann, 2002). Other interaction patterns involve further processing of enactments, such as exploring the patient' s prereflective unconscious or organizing principles as described by Stolorow and colleagues (Orange et al., 1997; Stolorow & Atwood, 1992), or providing verbal description of unformulated experience as described by Donnel B. Stern (Stern, 2019). Here, dissociation replaces repression as the cornerstone concept, becoming a focus for many intersubjective analysts, particularly in the theories of Bromberg and Stern (Spezzano, 2012).

Finally, from a foundationalist, realist, or positivist perspective to an orientation toward hermeneutics and constructivism (Muller, 2016). Classical psychoanalysis contains an "archaeological metaphor," suggesting that analysts can, like archaeologists, excavate layer by layer to ultimately discover the truth of the patient' s early experiences (Mitchell, 2016). This is closely related to Freud' s conception of the unconscious as having "timelessness" (Noel-Smith, 2016). In this conception, various materials presented by the patient in treatment are complete "copies" of the past, "uncontaminated" by present experience. Mitchell (2016) summarizes this as "the present is the past, the past is repeated over and over again" (p. 108). Correspondingly, the analyst must remain neutral and objective, abstaining from satisfying the patient' s needs or giving advice. Consequently, Stolorow and colleagues (Jaenicke, 2008; Stolorow & Atwood, 1997) criticize this as "the myth of neutrality." In contrast, from an intersubjective perspective, the patient' s experience is a text full of confusion and incoherence that does not possess a ready-made, fixed meaning but needs to be continuously clarified through the analyst' s participation (Muller, 2016). The analyst has

irreducible subjectivity and cannot function as a bystander or "blank screen" but inevitably has a bidirectional influence with the patient. Depending on the situation, the analyst may also need to engage in varying degrees of self-disclosure (Delgado et al., 2015; Renik & Spillius, 2004). Levine and Friedman (2000) even state bluntly, "If there is no intense and passionate contact between analyst and analysand, no genuine therapeutic encounter will occur" (p. 89). Against the concrete spatiotemporal background where both parties bring their own histories and subjectivities, the patient' s experience is redescribed, defined, interpreted, and created (Muller, 2016). In short, the present is not a repetition of the past but always includes a "here and now" dimension; the analytic process is not about discovering early truths but about constructing the meaning of experience.

4 The Intersubjective Turn Worldwide

Is it true, as some researchers mentioned above claim, that the entire field of psychoanalysis has undergone an intersubjective turn? In fact, analysts have some disagreements about the extent to which intersubjective theory has influenced the psychoanalytic movement. To answer this question, we need to broaden our perspective. Looking at the world, psychoanalytic researchers are mainly distributed across North America, Europe, and Latin America. Therefore, whether an intersubjective turn has occurred in psychoanalysis requires a more detailed examination of each region.

4.1 North America

Within the global context, intersubjectivity is particularly prevalent in North America (Bohleber, 2013; Schwartz, 2012) and is therefore more familiar to the academic community. In the 1960s, ego psychology dominated North America, making it the "territory" of one-person psychology. However, as the work of Greenberg and Mitchell unfolded (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983; Mitchell, 2016), British object relations theory gradually entered the horizon of North American psychoanalysis, and with the "response" of indigenous American interpersonal psychoanalysis and self psychology, themes such as "interpersonal interaction" and "relationship" gained widespread acceptance and attention, and the sweeping relational movement began to take shape. Additionally, starting in the 1970s, many infant researchers (such as Trevarthen, Stern, Beebe, and Lachmann) made important research achievements in mother-infant interaction, emphasizing that infants begin interacting with caregivers within a very short time after birth (Schwartz, 2012; Seligman, 2018). During the same period, Stolorow and Atwood introduced intersubjectivity as a methodological concept into American psychoanalysis (Atwood & Stolorow, 2014; Stolorow et al., 1978). This work is regarded as a landmark event for the intersubjective orientation, highly valued by Aron (Aron, 1996), and subsequently had a major impact on the American psychoanalytic field. Tessier even calls Stolorow the "father of the term' s usage" (Kirshner, 2017). Thus, under the "converging attack" of numerous intersub-

jective researchers, the hegemonic position of ego psychology was shaken and gradually defeated (Kirshner, 2017; Schwartz, 2012).

If we classify current intersubjective analysts in North America according to their psychoanalytic school backgrounds, they can be divided into three major groups (Harris et al., 2019). The first group developed primarily from self psychology, represented by Stolorow, Atwood, and Orange (Benjamin, 2016; Kirshner, 2017). They hold a radical stance, arguing that the intersubjective perspective brings about a metapsychological-level transformation and advocate abandoning many reified structural concepts in traditional psychoanalytic theory (such as id, ego, and superego) in favor of describing experience in a more phenomenological manner (using terms like prereflective unconscious and organizing principles) (Atwood & Stolorow, 2014). In their view, Freud followed a Cartesian "isolated mind,"and some two-person psychology orientations have not escaped this constraint, merely conceiving of intersubjectivity as a "collision" between two isolated minds (Orange et al., 1997). In fact, the intersubjective field is a precondition for the emergence of subjective experience; "without the occurring intersubjective context, psychological phenomena cannot be understood" (Stolorow et al., 1987, p. 64). Correspondingly, psychoanalysis is "a science of the intersubjective" and should focus on the interaction between different subjective worlds (Atwood & Stolorow, 2014). Psychoanalytic treatment is a process in which the patient' s subjective world gradually unfolds, is revealed, interpreted, and ultimately changes, achieved mainly through "empathic-introspective inquiry" (Jaenicke, 2008). In other words, for Stolorow and colleagues, although the subject nominally still exists, it is in fact dissolved into the intersubjective field and cannot exist independently of it (Bohleber, 2013). As Frederickson (2005) and Bohleber (2010) put it, this is "intersubjectivity without a subject."

The second group consists of intersubjectivity developed mainly from interpersonal and relational psychoanalysis, including Benjamin, Aron, Ogden, Bromberg, Beebe and Lachmann, and can also include BCPSG (see Benjamin, 2016). In this perspective, intersubjectivity is usually similar in meaning to interpersonal, relational, or two-person concepts, in contrast to the intrapsychic dimension emphasized in one-person psychology. More specifically, Harris et al. (2019) summarize several meanings of intersubjectivity within the relational perspective, which this paper interprets in greater detail: (1) the social dimension of individual experience, meaning that interpersonal interaction is indispensable in individual life; (2) the two-person field, encompassing unconscious, preconscious, and conscious levels, representing multiple pathways of interpersonal communication and mutual shaping; (3) interpersonal or collective shared experience, emphasizing the inseparable and intertwined parts between different subjects; (4) the emergence of unique experiences for individuals, dyads, or multiples within a fused, contextualized background, meaning the "creativity" in interpersonal interaction; (5) the intrusion of the other' s "otherness" into the individual. The scope of this other can be as large as a nation or as small as changes in shared states. This emphasizes that the subject is situated within a complex relational network and influenced

by multiple factors; (6) the clinical significance of intersubjectivity, such as enactment. This refers to the analyst and patient responding with action, as mentioned earlier.

The third group can be seen as a mixed integrative orientation, combining intersubjectivity with theories more aligned with classical psychoanalysis, such as North American intersubjective ego psychology and post-Kleinian and post-Bionian intersubjectivity (Harris et al., 2019). In North American intersubjective ego psychology, Chodorow and Warren Poland are representative, with the former even calling this orientation a unique American contribution. These researchers focus on "internal events" such as intrapsychic conflict, compromise formation, and fantasy on the one hand, and on the other hand explore how "external environments" such as interpersonal and cultural factors shape the mind. However, in their view, individual uniqueness and individuality are not dissolved by being in relationship. Correspondingly, exploring transference-countertransference interactions in treatment is not the main goal but serves the patient' s individuality (Chodorow, 2016). As Harris et al. (2019) put it, they adopt both ego psychological and intersubjective viewpoints while modifying each. In North American post-Kleinian and post-Bionian approaches, James Grotstein and Lawrence Brown are representative figures of the intersubjective orientation. Grotstein developed an integrated view of intersubjectivity based on Bion and some Latin American and Italian researchers. In his work, concepts such as intra-subjective, intersubjective, and trans-subjective are rooted in the alterity of the "other," based on the unconscious and primary process, and are clinically observed, presented, and experienced at the phenomenological level (Grotstein, 2005). Brown combines Freudian, Kleinian, and Bionian theories to explore narratives of unconscious configurations co-created by both parties as a tool for exploring the patient' s trauma and personal history. For him, intersubjectivity is a process of unconscious communication, reception, and meaning-making between the interacting parties that brings unique meaning into their shared emotional field (Brown, 2011).

If we regard the above discussion as the first classification method, three additional classifications can be attempted. In the second classification, some researchers hold a radical stance, arguing that intersubjective theory is incompatible with traditional theory, focusing mainly on the interpersonal dimension and largely neglecting the intrapsychic dimension. This mainly includes the first group and some researchers from the second group, representing what Wallerstein (1998) calls an "either/or" position across two dimensions. Another group of researchers holds a more conservative stance, advocating for maintaining some theoretical continuity with traditional theory while emphasizing the intersubjective dimension and also attending to the intrapsychic dimension. This mainly includes some researchers from the second group and the third group, representing Wallerstein' s (1998) "both/and" position across two dimensions. In the third classification method, some researchers argue that intersubjectivity brings about a metapsychological transformation—that is, a paradigm shift in psychoanalysis—which can encompass many analysts from the first and second groups.

Another group believes that intersubjectivity does not signify a metapsychological shift but rather a "correction" to the psychoanalytic movement in Green' s (2000) sense, thus largely retaining traditional psychoanalytic concepts. This is represented by the third group. In addition, a fourth classification can be made: some researchers in the above three groups have examined intersubjectivity at the theoretical level. However, most analysts lack a philosophical background and rarely trace the history of the intersubjectivity concept (Frie & Reis, 2001; Thompson, 2005), thus applying intersubjectivity only in clinical practice (Schwartz, 2012) without theoretical reflection. In other words, for them, intersubjectivity only signifies improvements and developments in clinical technique.

4.2 Europe

Similar to North America, European psychoanalysis has also undergone a shift from one-person to two-person psychology. The difference is that while the relational model in North America formed an opposition to the ego psychology model, the relationship between the relational model and traditional theory in Europe is more complex. An important reason is that European psychoanalytic circles' traditional theories were influenced by indigenous relational thinking (such as Ferenczi, Bowlby, and British object relations theory) from the beginning (Harris et al., 2019; Marzi et al., 2006). Although its relational theory is not as fully developed as the North American relational movement, it still provided fertile ground for the emergence of intersubjective theory.

Intersubjectivity in European psychoanalysis generally refers to the interaction between two people, focusing on communication within the analytic dyad while neglecting drives and intrapsychic dynamics. Overall, research on intersubjectivity has concentrated on the following aspects: (1) intersubjectivity in countertransference and projective identification, emphasizing mutual influence and shaping in the analytic interaction; (2) intersubjectivity in infant research, similar to North America; (3) field theory, represented by Ferro (see earlier discussion); (4) subjectivation and intersubjectivation. Here, intersubjectivity is seen as a process that occurs and changes over time. "Subjectivation" is the process of becoming a subject, which is essentially intersubjective because others play a crucial role from the beginning. In recent years, terms such as becoming a subject, subjectivation, and intersubjectivation have become popular, replacing previous descriptions of self development more common in French and Italian; (5) conceptual distinctions between subject and person (see Harris et al., 2019).

Looking at more specific regions, the United Kingdom is "first in line." After Freud' s death in 1939, the British psychoanalytic camp split. With the "Freud-Klein Controversies" of 1941–1945, British psychoanalysis presented a tripartite situation: the "Kleinian school" led by Klein, the "Viennese school" led by Anna Freud, and the "Independent school" represented by Winnicott, Fairbairn, and Balint (Wang et al., 2017). These three groups maintained their differences for a long time. However, over the past few decades, mutual exchange within

the British psychoanalytic community has brought greater heterogeneity within groups and greater convergence between groups—especially under the leadership of the Independent school, which views analytic therapy as an intersubjective process. Currently, the Independent school has significantly shifted from "object relations" to "subject relations" (Raphael-Leff, 2012). Kleinian successors have gradually developed post-Kleinian and post-Bionian schools, whose core concepts (projective identification, countertransference, containment, and contained) focus on intersubjective communication, particularly bidirectional unconscious interaction and mutual shaping (Spillius, 2012). Even the Viennese school, which is closest to classical psychoanalysis, has changed considerably: although rarely using the term intersubjectivity, analysts at the Anna Freud Center are quite interested in infant research findings (such as infants' sociality from birth and verbal and nonverbal communication between mother and infant) (Salo, 2012). Peter Fonagy and Mary Target have become key figures in mentalization theory. For Fonagy and colleagues, the individual' s awareness of their own and others' mental states becomes the focus (Allen et al., 2016; Fonagy, 2018; Fonagy et al., 2002). Thus, it can be said that the British psychoanalytic community has largely moved toward intersubjective theory.

In contrast, due to translation lags, intersubjective theory in continental Europe has only become known to the academic community in recent years. In fact, under the influence of the phenomenological movement, continental Europe began gradually focusing on interaction between subjects from the early last century. In the 1950s, Ludwig Binswanger and Viktor von Weizsäcker introduced the philosophical concept of encounter into psychoanalytic therapy. For Binswanger, Buber' s "in-between," Heidegger' s "being-with" and "being-there-with" became important sources of his thought. Subsequently, encounter became popular in the German psychoanalytic field. By the mid-1960s, Hans-Georg Gadamer' s hermeneutics became an important theoretical resource for psychoanalysis, and his "question-answer" dialogical structure inspired many analysts. For example, Hermann Argelander' s "scenic understanding" involves both parties opening themselves up through interaction to promote mutual understanding (Bohleber, 2010, 2013).

Among all continental European regions, France is the main theoretical and clinical exporter in the post-Freudian period, and its situation is more complex. Generally, French psychoanalysis maintains a very conservative attitude toward American intersubjective theory but has been greatly influenced by British object relations theory. As a result, France has formed three different attitudes toward intersubjectivity: First, based on Lacan' s doctrine, advocating a "return to Freud" and generally rejecting relational orientations in psychoanalysis. For these researchers, Freud' s (and Lacan' s) exploration of the unconscious led to the complete dissolution of the subject concept (Lazar, 2001), while relational orientations omit the main content of the unconscious, especially primitive fantasies (such as castration anxiety and the Oedipus complex). Additionally, some critics raise more comprehensive questions about the relational paradigm: for example, relational analysts' excessive focus on emotion contradicts the princi-

ple of neutrality, potentially turning the analytic process into curing patients with love, and is unhelpful for analyzing how drives stimulate the individual; the relational paradigm replaces metapsychology with hermeneutics, social constructivism, and narrative methods, which cannot explain the characteristics of unconscious derivatives, and the resulting pluralism and eclecticism are also unacceptable (Harris et al., 2019).

Second, based on Jean Laplanche' s generalized seduction theory, affirming the interpersonal nature of the sexual unconscious' s formation and creating a metapsychological orientation similar to intersubjective theory. Although Laplanche is reluctant to use terms such as subject, subjectivity, and intersubjectivity, he extends Lacan's concept of the "traumatic real" into the intersubjective domain. He retains many metapsychological concepts and, while insisting on the central role of infantile sexuality in the formation of the mind (especially the sexual unconscious and ego), emphasizes the crucial role of others (Harris et al., 2019). For Laplanche, adults communicate with children through both verbal and nonverbal information. However, limited by their immaturity, children can only partially interpret them, so this content remains highly mysterious, like a puzzle. These "untranslatable" messages constitute the content of the child' s unconscious (Bohleber, 2010). In other words, Laplanche replaces Freud' s "repression" with "translation" in his theory.

Third, accepting the views of Green, René Roussillon, and other "synthesists" who maintain a dialectical tension between the intersubjective and intrapsychic dimensions. For Green, American relational paradigms simplify psychoanalysis into pure relationships, thereby transforming it into a kind of "cognitive-behavioral therapy." Instead, he prefers the work of Winnicott and Bion, emphasizing the coupling of drives and object relations to depict intersubjectivity. Specifically, at the intrapsychic level, the unconscious consists of drive derivatives seeking discharge pathways. This content is what has never been symbolized (i.e., the content of "primal repression") or what has been "de-symbolized" (i.e., its connection to the symbolic network has been broken, content of secondary repression), mainly expressed through enactment and somatization (Harris et al., 2019). At the intersubjective level, a subject can only be realized in relation to another other; there is no single subject alone: "A sufficiently similar other makes identification possible, thus becoming aid when the individual is isolated and helpless" (Green, 2000, p. 19). For Roussillon, intersubjectivity involves the unconscious dimension of the subject. He defines intersubjectivity as an encounter between a subject driven by drives and possessing an unconscious life and another similar subject. For him, the drive is a message directed at the object through language, emotion, and behavior, and the object' s response to this message is a fundamental component of psychoanalytic work. The core of intersubjectivity is exploring the unconscious intentionality of both parties. Other "synthesists" express similar positions. For example, Brusset believes that object relations theory should not be opposed to drive theory, and their combination helps reveal symbolization and "subjectivization" in new ways. For Golse, intersubjectivity can be used to understand the articulation and recognition between

two different psychological spaces. Widlöcher points out that intersubjectivity should not be seen as simple interaction between analyst and patient, but it helps analysts move away from the position of neutral observer and recognize the importance of subjective experience. He calls this "co-thinking" between both parties (Harris et al., 2019).

4.3 Latin America

Latin American psychoanalysis mainly originates from Europe. In a sense, Freud, Klein, Winnicott, and Lacan "founded" psychoanalysis in Latin America successively from the 1940s to the 1960s. Currently, Lacanian doctrine' s influence surpasses Freudian and Kleinian traditions, occupying a certain dominant position in Latin America (especially in academia) (Harris et al., 2019). However, Latin American psychoanalysis is not a "copy" of European and American versions but has fused with local unique social and cultural backgrounds, creating perspectives from figures such as Enrique Pichon-Rivière, the Baranger couple, José Bleger, and María Cristina, especially their exploration of vínculo/link (Bernardi & de Leon De Bernardi, 2012; Gabbard, 2012). This has gradually formed an important branch of the Latin American intersubjective orientation —the vínculo perspective.

In terms of theoretical perspectives, another important branch of the Latin American intersubjective orientation is the relational perspective, which has many similarities and differences with the vínculo perspective. Their similarities lie in both viewing transference as a repetitive yet novel event and considering "opportunities" and "events" in individual life as important psychological dynamics. Their differences are mainly manifested in three aspects (see Harris et al., 2019): First, in terms of intellectual origins, the vínculo perspective is based on the British Bionian school and post-Lacanian French psychoanalytic views and is currently popular in Latin American psychoanalytic societies. In contrast, the relational perspective originates from the British Independent school and other researchers and has been greatly influenced by the North American relational-intersubjective orientation. This perspective is widely adopted in Chile and Peru, and its influence is steadily increasing in Uruguay, Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico. Second, regarding the motivation of mental activity, the vínculo perspective has not departed from Freud' s basic assumption of viewing individual sexuality or drives as the basic motivation; the relational perspective, while considering the Oedipus complex, also values other broader motivations such as attachment and mutual recognition. This involves a wide range of processes including psychological regulation, exploration, play, and social referencing. Third, at the level of psychotherapy, the vínculo perspective is applied to group, couple, and family therapy (Berenstein, 2012) but does not involve paradigm shifts. The relational perspective is rooted in the paradigm shift of psychoanalysis. Correspondingly, the analyst is not an interpreter of drives and defenses but a facilitator of the analytic relationship. Therefore, the therapeutic process involves "re-editing" the patient' s transference and generating

new experiences in the relational field.

From a clinical practice perspective, although Lacanian doctrine has great influence, many analysts who accept more pluralistic theoretical approaches are closer to the intersubjective orientation. The reason is that Latin American analysts cover a wide socioeconomic range, including both independent professionals and employees of medical insurance companies. Among them, analysts with low and unstable incomes often have to "step out of the consulting room" to seek other sources of income, thus becoming intertwined with more realistic social life. As a result, even if these analysts do not reference the works and papers of intersubjective analysts, when dealing with patients from diverse backgrounds, they often "suspend" their own theoretical views in clinical practice, become more context-sensitive, and find therapeutic experiences that resonate with them. They also tend to focus on patients' subjective experiences and emphasize an empathic participatory attitude, thus gradually becoming experts in intersubjective practice (Harris et al., 2019).

In summary, intersubjective psychoanalysis is widespread worldwide, influencing researchers in the field in various ways. Analysts have several different attitudes toward this orientation: (1) advocating that intersubjective theory brings about a paradigm shift in psychoanalysis, achieving metapsychological transformation, and can even completely replace traditional theory; (2) believing that the intersubjective orientation' s emphasis on the interpersonal dimension is very inspiring but insufficient to completely replace traditional theory, and that the two can form a complementary relationship; (3) applying clinical techniques brought by the intersubjective perspective but lacking theoretical reflection; (4) rarely using the terminology of intersubjective theory but engaging in clinical practice in an intersubjective manner; (5) questioning and criticizing the intersubjective orientation and choosing to embrace more traditional theories. The first four categories of analysts constitute a larger proportion, especially in North America. Therefore, Bohleber' s (2013) claim is basically accurate: the field of psychoanalysis has largely undergone an intersubjective turn.

The intersubjective turn in psychoanalysis has occurred partly due to influence from other disciplinary fields (such as philosophy, infant research, and neuroscience) and partly because of problems encountered by many analysts in clinical practice: when previous theories and techniques were insufficient to address patients' problems, some analysts would "find another way" in practice or even "update" theory. In other words, when theory conflicts with clinical material, the key is to adjust theoretical constructs to make them coherent with clinical material (see Mitchell, 2016). This also means that when facing previous psychoanalytic theories, the reasonable approach is not, as some previous analysts did, to restrict the "updating" of theory to maintain a kind of "loyalty" or "orthodoxy." This is like "storing a set of precious porcelain left by ancestors in a glass cabinet, fearing it cannot withstand the dishwasher' s turmoil" (Quinodoz, 2016, p. 506). To maintain the vitality of psychoanalysis, a more appropriate approach is to maintain openness and engage in continuous dialogue: dialogue

with previous theories, dialogue with clinical material, and dialogue with other disciplinary fields. Similarly, at a time when intersubjective theory has gained such tremendous influence, it should also be recognized that it still faces many problems, such as numerous internal divisions and criticism from more traditional analysts. This further increases the necessity for dialogue. If we look at the history of the psychoanalytic movement, "reviewing the rise and fall of psychoanalysis in the American mental health field, we will understand that psychoanalysis needs to strengthen cooperation and exchange with other fields and must not become isolated and self-enclosed" (Zhang, 2019, p. 92).

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