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The Belt and Road Initiative: Postprint on Security Risk Prevention and Control for China's Overseas Interests

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Abstract

[Purpose/Significance] Following the 9/11 attacks, terrorist activities worldwide have exhibited an escalating trend, predominantly concentrated in countries along the Belt and Road Initiative. Throughout the development of the Belt and Road Initiative, China's overseas interests confront substantial security vulnerabilities, necessitating corresponding intervention measures to achieve the transfer and mitigation of security risks. [Method/Process] Drawing upon terrorism incident data, this study analyzes the spatio-temporal evolution and distribution characteristics of terrorist attacks to assess the security situation in countries along the route. By examining the international police cooperation model, state armed escort model, and security marketization model, we conduct a comparative analysis of their cost-effectiveness. [Results/Conclusion] Security marketization represents a cost-effective comprehensive risk management methodology that can achieve the transfer and mitigation of security risks for China's overseas interests by minimizing expected loss at the lowest resource consumption. However, Chinese private security companies exhibit numerous shortcomings in international security operations; China should undertake initiatives in legal frameworks, professional talent cultivation, security industry development, and market access and supervision to support Chinese private security companies in expanding overseas to safeguard China's overseas interests.

Full Text

The Belt and Road Initiative: Risk Prevention and Control for China's Overseas Interests Security

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Abstract

[Purpose/Significance] Following the September 11 attacks, terrorist activities worldwide have exhibited a growing trend, concentrated primarily in countries along the Belt and Road Initiative. During the construction of the Belt and Road, China's overseas interests face enormous security risks that require intervention measures to achieve risk transfer and reduction.

[Method/Process] This study analyzes the spatiotemporal evolution and distribution characteristics of terrorist attacks based on terrorism incident data to assess the security situation in countries along the route. By examining three security models—international police cooperation, national armed escort, and marketized security—we compare their cost-effectiveness.

[Result/Conclusion] Marketized security represents a cost-effective comprehensive risk management approach that can achieve risk transfer and reduction for China's overseas interests through minimal resource consumption in exchange for minimal expected losses. However, Chinese private security companies face numerous shortcomings in international security operations. China should develop legal frameworks, cultivate professional talent, foster the security industry, and establish market access and regulatory mechanisms to support private security companies in safeguarding China's overseas interests.

Keywords: Belt and Road Initiative; Overseas Interests; Security

Classification Number: C939

The Belt and Road Initiative represents a major measure for China to promote a new pattern of comprehensive opening-up. The 19th Party Congress report explicitly states: “We should focus on the Belt and Road construction, adhere to the principle of bringing in and going out equally, follow the principle of extensive consultation, joint contribution, and shared benefits, strengthen open cooperation in innovation capabilities, and form an open pattern that links land and sea, and balances east and west.” As China enters a new era emphasizing the building of a trade powerhouse and Chinese enterprises “going out,” the Belt and Road countries suffer from frequent terrorist activities while China's domestic stability maintenance forces remain “beyond reach.” How, then, can China transfer and reduce security risks to its overseas interests? Three measures—prevention, crisis management and emergency response, and recovery—can all intervene in attack incidents, though with different effects. Through analysis of international police cooperation, national armed escort, and marketized security models, we argue that marketized security is a cost-effective comprehensive risk management approach that can achieve risk transfer and reduction for China's overseas interests through minimal resource consumption in exchange for minimal expected losses.

1. Persistent Terrorist Activities in Countries Along the Belt and Road

According to the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) from the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, over 170,000 terrorist attacks occurred worldwide between 1970 and 2016, concentrated primarily in the Middle East and South Asia—the main regions traversed by the Belt and Road. This paper analyzes the spatiotemporal evolution and distribution characteristics of terrorist attacks based on terrorism incident data to assess the security situation in countries along the route, aiming to provide constructive policy recommendations for China’s national security strategy formulation and implementation and for protecting Chinese overseas interests along the Belt and Road.

1.1 Spatial Distribution of Terrorism in Belt and Road Countries

Geographically, the Belt and Road covers Asia, Europe, and Africa. The “Belt” traverses the Eurasian continent, while the “Road” passes through Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and the western Indian Ocean. The GTD’s global terrorism map for 1970-2016 clearly shows that North Africa, the Middle East, West Asia, Central Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia constitute the regions with the highest frequency and intensity of terrorist attacks worldwide. The Belt and Road passes through several countries with the most severe terrorist activities, including Pakistan, Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, Somalia, Nigeria, Bangladesh, and India on land, as well as the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia along maritime routes.

Since the September 11 attacks, global terrorist forces have continued to grow, with both attack frequency and fatalities showing an upward trend. Over 97,000 terrorist attacks occurred globally, with South Asian and Middle Eastern countries accounting for nearly 70% of the total—more than 60,000 incidents—making them the most active regions for terrorist attacks worldwide. Islamic countries are high-incidence areas for terrorist attacks, with over 14,800 terrorism incidents related to Islamic religious extremism since September 11, resulting in nearly 90,000 deaths across 58 countries, more than half of which are countries or regions where Islam is practiced or predominantly practiced. Terrorism often breeds in cross-border areas, involving both transnational ethnic groups and transnational religions. Transnational nationalism manifests in two ways: first, when a country’s dominant ethnic group seeks to control its co-ethnics in neighboring countries, such as Pan-Kazakhism and Pan-Kyrgyzism in Central Asia; second, when it advocates for the unification of states formed by the same ethnicity or different branches with blood and religious ties into a single entity, such as Pan-Islamism in West Asia and Pan-Turkism in Central Asia. Africa, Central Asia, and the Balkans host the world’s largest number of cross-border ethnic groups and simultaneously experience frequent ethnic and religious conflicts, making them rampant breeding grounds for terrorism.

[Figure 1: see original paper] 1970-2016 World Terrorist Attacks Map

[Figure 2: see original paper] Distribution of Terrorist Attacks in Global Regions Since “9.11”

The Middle East primarily exhibits Islamic religious extremist terrorism. The “war on terror” led by the United States in the Middle East since September 11 has created chaos in Islamic countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, and Libya, giving rise to new terrorist forces that continuously integrate and develop with existing organizations. This has resulted in four major terrorist groups in the most active countries: the “Islamic State” in Iraq and Syria, the “Taliban” and “Al-Qaeda” in Afghanistan, and “Boko Haram” in Nigeria, continuously deteriorating the security situation in the Middle East and Persian Gulf region.

South Asia is a traditional hotspot for ethnic separatist terrorist activities. According to statistics, approximately 176 terrorist, extremist, and ethnic separatist organizations are highly active in South Asia. Terrorists have established a “Mujahideen Movement Network” in Kashmir, Afghanistan, and India, seriously affecting political development and ethnic integration in the region. Pakistan, a key partner in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, hosts about 16 domestic extremist organizations and 32 transnational terrorist groups. India experiences frequent terrorist attacks, with the 2008 Mumbai attacks causing hundreds of civilian casualties and over 1,000 attacks occurring in 2016 alone. Sri Lanka’s Tamil Tigers represent the largest and most active terrorist organization in the country, while up to 36 armed organizations aiming to establish a Tamil state have also emerged.

Central Asia, bordering China, serves as an important channel for the Silk Road and a crucial geographical barrier for China’s peripheral strategic security. Central Asian countries possess extremely special geostrategic positions, complex regional ethnic and religious relations, and constitute a major arena for great power competition. Terrorist activities there combine characteristics of religious extremism and ethnic separatist forces, with infiltration from the Taliban and Al-Qaeda from West Asia and the Middle East, and influences from Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism. This has resulted in frequent terrorist activities in eastern Tajikistan, southern Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. The “East Turkistan” separatist organization in China’s Xinjiang has long received training and funding from the “East Turkistan Islamic Movement” and Al-Qaeda operating in this region.

Threats to the “Maritime Silk Road” concentrate in Southeast Asia, the Bay of Bengal, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea regions, with Southeast Asia being the most active area for terrorist activities. In Southeast Asia, active terrorist groups include the New People’s Army, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines, the Malaysian Islamic Prayer Group, and the “Malay Archipelago Unit,” comprising both radical nationalists and Islamic religious extremist organizations. In recent years, as Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State have expanded, Southeast Asian terrorist groups have pledged allegiance

to them, enabling regional organizations to connect and jointly conduct terrorist attacks.

1.2 Temporal Trends of Terrorist Attacks in Belt and Road Countries Since 9/11

[Figure 3: see original paper] Yearly Trend of Terrorist Attack Incidents

Observation and analysis of the international security situation since September 11 reveal that global terrorist attacks have generally shown an increasing trend year by year. From 2011 to 2014, the overall number grew slowly before experiencing explosive growth starting in 2011, peaking around 2014. Although the number declined slightly in 2015-2016, it remained at a high level. The trend of terrorist attacks in Belt and Road countries has basically aligned with global trends, with these countries accounting for the vast majority of global incidents each year, directly demonstrating the severe terrorism situation along the route.

Since the beginning of the new century, the Asia-Pacific geopolitical landscape has become increasingly complex, and the security environment has grown more fragile. Under active intervention and malicious manipulation by some Western countries, contradictions in many sensitive regions have been provoked and erupted, making the already chaotic political situations in Southeast Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East even more turbulent. This has led to rapid development of terrorist attacks with increasingly obvious internationalization trends and continuous diffusion. In recent years, to advance its “Asia-Pacific Rebalancing” strategy and strengthen military forces in East Asia to contain China, the United States has had to conduct partial strategic contraction in the Middle East. The withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq and Afghanistan has created opportunities for terrorist forces in the region, with large numbers of terrorist organizations flowing back to West Asia. Al-Qaeda’s Iraqi branch has accelerated its actions to establish a grand Islamic state in the Middle East. Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan have strengthened their activities and attempted to infiltrate Pakistan, Central Asia, and northwestern China. The Kashmir region has suffered Taliban movement infiltration, with continuous terrorist attacks against India’s border. The “Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria,” established in Syria, has risen rapidly since 2014 and publicly declared statehood. Its enormous influence and demonstration effect have attracted local and international terrorist organizations worldwide to pledge allegiance, leading to a new round of integration among global terrorist forces. In the past two years, as the United States and Russia have jointly targeted the Islamic State, its “occupied territories” have continuously shrunk, but the probability of its members infiltrating other countries and launching “lone wolf” terrorist attacks has increased.

1.3 Target Characteristics of Terrorist Attacks Along the Belt and Road

[Figure 4: see original paper] Targets of Terrorist Attacks Along the Belt and

Road

Under the Belt and Road framework, China cooperates with countries along the route on infrastructure construction, energy extraction, and goods trade. Numerous state-owned and private enterprises go abroad, exporting talent and capital to Belt and Road countries. Over time, more Chinese enterprises will take root overseas, more Chinese citizens will work, live, and conduct trade abroad, and increasing Chinese assets will be established. As the world's most frequent region for terrorist activities, ensuring the safety of Chinese personnel and capital in Belt and Road countries is crucial. Analyzing target selection in terrorist attacks is also necessary to provide data support for formulating relevant security strategies.

Since September 11, over 77,000 terrorist attacks have occurred in more than 60 Belt and Road countries. Among these, over 20,000 targeted individuals and property (approximately 26% of the total), more than 25,000 targeted military and police (about 32%), and 8,600 targeted government institutions (about 11%). Attacks on commercial facilities totaled over 6,000 (approximately 8%). Terrorist organizations have political and religious objectives, making government departments, military, and police primary targets. Terrorists often use remote-controlled bombs, suicide bombs, and even heavy weapons to attack important targets, thereby promoting extremist ideologies and causing social panic.

Attacks on civilians generally exhibit randomness, with crowds gathered near important government institutions or religious sites becoming easy targets or being affected by explosions. Commercial facilities with weak security forces, such as construction sites and industrial parks, often become targets for armed attacks and kidnappings by terrorists. Incidents targeting employees of foreign companies for retaliation against their home countries, extorting high ransoms, or achieving political purposes have occurred frequently in recent years.

2. Security Supply Models for China's Overseas Interests

Logically, strategies to reduce uncertainty in security risks to China's overseas interests can be divided into three stages: first, before an attack occurs; second, during and immediately after an attack; and third, after the attack ceases, when victims initiate recovery efforts. Corresponding measures include three types: prevention, through which we intervene to prevent attacks or alter their consequences; crisis management and emergency response, through which we execute effective emergency measures to limit attack damage; and recovery, through which reconstruction restores post-attack social welfare to pre-attack levels. Below, we analyze several mainstream security models according to these three stages and measures.

2.1 International Police Cooperation Model

The Chinese government consistently prioritizes protecting China's overseas interests through diplomatic protection, consular protection, law enforcement protection, and even evacuation operations during crises to minimize losses. China has also attempted to develop international police cooperation models. On June 15, 2001, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization signed the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism. In 2009 and 2010, it signed the Resolution on Cooperation to Ensure the Security of Oil and Gas Pipelines in SCO Member States and the SCO Law Enforcement Security Cooperation Ministerial Meeting System, conducting law enforcement cooperation with other countries to protect China's overseas interests.

During Belt and Road construction, China will promote similar international security cooperation mechanisms like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. However, the SCO cooperation mechanism primarily involves signing agreements or conventions and holding decision-maker meetings to encourage member states to improve laws and operations in the security field on bilateral and multilateral bases to fulfill its original "security maintenance" purpose. These documents and meetings primarily adopt "recovery" measures—that is, they focus on reducing losses and conducting counterattacks after attacks (or incidents) occur.

While international police cooperation for rescue and recovery immediately after attacks is important, recovery measures should not be the only approach in managing uncertain attacks. In fact, we need a comprehensive large-scale risk management system that seeks and utilizes various cost-effective opportunities to reduce the negative impacts of major risk events.

2.2 National Armed Escort Model

In recent years, rampant piracy in the Gulf of Aden and Somali waters has posed serious threats to personnel and property safety for passing vessels. In response, China has continuously dispatched naval vessels to escort important sea lanes and protect maritime transportation lifelines. However, China consistently adheres to the principle of non-interference in other countries' internal affairs and will not intervene in other nations' domestic affairs. Within other countries' territories, China faces obstacles to directly dispatching military forces for security protection. Once investment host countries experience war or civil unrest, the Chinese government will not send troops into other countries for protection but will instead organize military forces to evacuate Chinese personnel and minimize losses.

During the recent Libya evacuation operation, China's deployment of warships indicated a shift in official attitude. Hong Kong's *Oriental Daily* reported that the Chinese government's increasing emphasis on the safety and interests of Chinese citizens overseas represents significant progress in Chinese diplomacy. Britain's *The Times* suggested that China's use of the navy for humanitarian

rescue operations may indicate a major transformation in China's diplomatic thinking. The *Wall Street Journal* believed Chinese decision-makers have set a precedent for similar future operations.

Both maritime escort missions and military evacuation operations effectively protect China's overseas interests. The national armed escort model adopts preventive intervention measures, acting before attacks occur by altering environmental conditions to prevent attacks or reduce losses. However, future Chinese overseas policy may not increase government supply for overseas interest protection, especially military involvement. Using the military for overseas security protection presents several drawbacks: mismatched means, mismatched scale, and mismatched information.

First, Chinese enterprises and citizens overseas face primarily non-traditional security issues such as economic and financial problems, commercial losses from terrorist attacks, and personal safety. The military, as a country's military force, represents a traditional security protection means serving primarily politics, military affairs, and diplomacy. Military deployment involves major national strategic decisions, can generally only be used temporarily, and cannot achieve normalized deployment, creating obvious mismatches between objectives and means.

Second, as the Belt and Road Initiative advances, China's overseas trade territory continuously expands, involving increasing countries and economic fields. Using the military to provide commercial and personal protection for overseas economic activities cannot meet the growing practical needs, representing a clear mismatch between traditional protection means and the scale of actual overseas interests.

Finally, while China has achieved certain successes in strengthening overseas military presence and deployment in recent years, dispatching troops abroad remains a weak point for Chinese forces. With few overseas military bases, insufficient deployment capabilities, and intelligence collection capabilities requiring improvement, overseas military deployment faces numerous challenges, creating information mismatches. Therefore, government-supplied, military-centered policies face various practical obstacles and cannot provide long-term effective security protection for China's overseas interests.

2.3 Marketized Security Model

When state-provided security cannot meet enterprises' and individuals' rigid demands, relevant parties will seek supplements from the market, primarily through private security companies. Private security companies offer efficiency, convenience, economic practicality, and non-political characteristics. Internationally, using private security companies to protect national enterprises and citizens is also common practice. For example, international shipping companies generally prefer hiring private security companies for maritime security. Some security companies with strong military capabilities are also hired as supplement-

tary forces in combating maritime violence such as piracy. Data shows that in pirate-infested waters like the Gulf of Aden and Somalia, 15-35% of commercial vessels rely on private security companies for armed protection, with nearly half of merchant ships employing such services by 2011.

Private security companies first enhance employers' self-defense capabilities and expand their right to self-defense. Second, they perform duties that should be fulfilled by police and national security departments, compensating for insufficient numbers and filling gaps in certain special areas. The relationship between private and public security involves both competition and complementarity. Finally, private security highlights its subjectivity, forming a collaborative relationship with public power. The existence of private security companies is also rational: enterprises or individuals hiring private security companies transfer "security risks" to professional institutions, which establish specialized forces to conduct emergency preparedness and response work. Private security companies can develop measures to prevent attacks or reduce attack damage at lower social costs and with fewer inputs, and promptly mobilize all forces to implement these measures.

China's private security companies have a long history, traceable to ancient escort agencies (*biaojū*) that originated in the Song Dynasty, developed significantly during the Yuan and Ming Dynasties, and peaked in the Qing Dynasty. However, modern private security companies in China started relatively late after the founding of the People's Republic, and currently only a handful conduct international security business. In fact, the international security market is enormous, with industry growth exceeding 11% in 2015 and market size reaching \$170 billion in 2017. As China's foreign investment continues to increase, the Chinese market will account for over 30% of the global market, second only to the United States.

As China transitions from a wealthy nation to a powerful one and as more Chinese citizens and enterprises "go out" for overseas construction and international trade under the Belt and Road Initiative, while terrorist activities remain frequent in Belt and Road countries, the market for protecting China's overseas interests is huge, but marketized security supply is seriously insufficient. Currently, numerous Chinese enterprises choose to hire foreign private security companies to provide armed security for Chinese citizens, Chinese-flagged vessels and shipowners, and overseas company premises. During its WTO accession negotiations, China made no market access commitments for "investigation and security," so Chinese enterprises, vessels, and citizens hiring foreign private security companies for armed escorts overseas currently lacks legal legitimacy. Additionally, according to Article 22 of China's *Regulations on Security Services*, "Key security units designated by municipal-level or higher local people's governments that concern national security or involve state secrets shall not hire wholly foreign-owned, Sino-foreign joint venture, or Sino-foreign cooperative security service companies to provide security services." Hiring security enterprises with foreign capital clearly contradicts this regulation.

3. Policy Recommendations for the Marketization of Overseas Security for Chinese Interests

Terrorism is a common enemy of the world, yet terrorist activities worldwide have shown a growing trend since September 11, concentrated primarily in regions traversed by the Belt and Road. Chinese enterprises and citizens overseas increasingly rely on marketized security models to address their security needs. However, while foreign private security companies are well-resourced, they conflict with Chinese regulations and rules. Chinese private security companies remain underdeveloped, with few having gone abroad. Meanwhile, the privatization of security for China's overseas interests faces numerous urgent problems, and Chinese private security companies still have a long journey to become mature overseas security providers.

3.1 Legal Framework for International Security Marketization

China promulgated the *Regulations on Security Services* in January 2010. While comprehensive, these regulations lack foresight and failed to consider international security demands arising from Chinese enterprises "going out." However, most countries internationally maintain a generally permissive attitude toward private overseas security services, and private international security companies have a long development history abroad with rapid growth in recent years. Under the principle that "what is not prohibited by law is permitted," relevant laws and regulations do not prohibit Chinese private security companies from conducting overseas security services, establishing the legitimacy of their overseas presence. In March 2012, the Foreign Friendship Committee submitted the *Proposal on Strengthening Security Protection for Overseas Institutions and Citizens* at the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, recommending that the government issue relevant policies allowing Chinese security companies to conduct international security services and provide armed protection for Chinese institutions and enterprises in high-risk areas. Civilian demand for overseas security services is strong, calls for strengthening relevant legislation are growing, and the special nature and complexity of overseas private security services necessitate legislative regulation to prevent other risks and facilitate industry development. Considering these factors, the state should provide expansive interpretation of the *Regulations on Security Services* or formulate other legal norms to incorporate overseas private security services into legal frameworks and supervision.

Additionally, overseas security requires configuring appropriate levels of weapons and equipment based on target countries' security situations and regional stability. However, even if Chinese private security companies obtain and possess firearms in accordance with target countries' domestic laws, China's strict domestic firearms control under the principle of personal jurisdiction in China's *Criminal Law* means Chinese private security companies possessing firearms overseas would violate relevant Chinese laws and regulations. This practical dilemma requires comprehensive legislative solutions.

3.2 Professional Talent Cultivation for International Security Marketization

The enormous demand for protecting China's overseas interests presents important transformation and upgrading opportunities for Chinese private security companies. Chinese private security companies need to strengthen cooperation with mature Western private security companies, exchange experiences, and learn successful practices to cultivate professional talent teams. In fact, the private security industry in developed countries like Europe and the United States has a long history, with most establishing complete sets of scientific and standardized industry norms and robust vocational training systems. Governments also emphasize talent education in the security industry, with many comprehensive universities offering security majors providing bachelor's and master's degree programs for security professionals. In the United States, for example, over 300 colleges and universities have security majors, including 50 offering bachelor's programs and 9 offering master's programs, with more than half of U.S. security industry practitioners holding college degrees or higher.

Chinese governments at all levels should vigorously coordinate educational resource allocation, change previous misconceptions and occupational biases about security work, support the establishment of international security academies, recruit veterans and athletes, develop relevant vocational training systems and professional cultivation programs, and form systematic, long-term, and stable professional talent cultivation to continuously provide high-quality professionals for private security companies to go abroad and safeguard China's overseas interests. This also represents an effective measure to implement the 19th Party Congress's decision to "establish veterans' management and security institutions to protect the legitimate rights and interests of military personnel and their families," providing veterans with professional training and regular channels for high-quality employment.

3.3 Security Industry Cultivation for International Security Marketization

In recent years, China's security industry has become increasingly competitive overseas. Many domestic security enterprises, such as Hikvision and Dahua Technology, have made overseas markets part of their future development strategies and actively expanded their presence. These outstanding domestic enterprises expanding into overseas security markets reflects their strategic development needs and directions, while also demonstrating the promising nature of overseas security markets. The security market prospects for China's overseas interests in Belt and Road countries are optimistic, but domestic security enterprises suffer from serious product homogenization and need to improve product customization and professional services.

Differences exist between domestic and overseas markets. How can we provide professional solutions based on scenarios where China's overseas interests are

located? Demand leads industrial development direction. As Chinese private security companies go abroad and conduct security operations, they will gain deep understanding of local conditions and security scenarios, connect demands with domestic security enterprises, and customize security products that meet actual needs. This will provide the best “testing ground” for China’s security industry to expand into overseas markets. Meanwhile, Chinese private security companies can provide professional protection for China’s overseas interests through “personnel + systems,” and can also explore providing professional security services for citizens and enterprises of other countries overseas, compensating for current shortcomings in the security industry and helping China’s security industry occupy a larger international market share sooner.

3.4 Market Access and Supervision for International Security Marketization

As Belt and Road construction advances and state-owned enterprises “go out,” the industry for protecting China’s overseas interests will flourish. During the process of private security companies exploring overseas markets, the absence of corresponding laws and regulations for recognition and standardization may lead to 野蛮生长 (unchecked growth) and disorderly development. Chinese regulatory authorities should clarify the qualification conditions and review standards for domestic private security companies to conduct overseas business. Simultaneously, comprehensively considering actual demand for protecting China’s overseas interests and international practices, and combining the rights protection needs of Chinese private security companies, legislation should clearly define the scope of overseas business for private security companies to effectively protect the legitimate rights and interests of the security industry.

Meanwhile, private security companies conducting overseas security business should strengthen corporate self-discipline, learn from advanced domestic and international experiences, strive to meet the actual security needs of China’s overseas interests, and participate in international security market competition in an orderly manner. Domestic security associations should gradually establish and improve evaluation systems for overseas security talent, provide standardized contracts for overseas security services, formulate relevant service standards and procedures, and establish and improve reporting, monitoring, and archiving systems for overseas security plans and measures. As industry self-regulation organizations, security associations at all levels should play their role, strictly enforce market access mechanisms, actively formulate relevant industry standards and norms, conduct qualification certification and rating assessments, exert their organizational and management functions, innovate cooperation methods, clarify reward and punishment systems, fully exercise their autonomy, and consciously accept guidance and supervision from relevant regulatory authorities.

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Author Contributions

Sun Yongsheng: Conceived the overall ideas and main arguments, wrote Sections 2 and 3.

Wu Yongchao: Wrote Section 1.

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