

Rural Households' Homestead Land Exit Intention Based on Collective Land Property Rights and Functions: An Empirical Analysis of Songjiang and Jinshan Districts, Shanghai (Postprint)

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Abstract

Rural households' withdrawal from homestead land is a major issue concerning China's urbanization and new rural construction. This study explores the influencing factors of rural households' homestead land withdrawal from the perspective of homestead land property rights. Through field surveys of relevant data in Shanghai's Songjiang and Jinshan districts, a Logistic regression model with 29 indicators as basic variables was established to quantitatively analyze rural households' willingness to withdraw from homestead land based on their various property rights derived from collective land ownership. The research results indicate: 1) Rural households have a clear understanding of their rights to homestead land and strong willingness to withdraw; they are particularly concerned about expected compensation in their anticipation of homestead land withdrawal and welfare perception, as well as their economic status after withdrawal, and they strongly desire the development of homestead land into commercial land in their cognition of homestead land development rights. 2) The property rights that rural households enjoy over homestead land mainly include residential security, use rights, and property rights and interests; the clearer their understanding of homestead land property rights, the stronger their awareness of protecting their own rights, and safeguarding rural households' rights and interests from damage is a prerequisite for their active and voluntary participation in homestead land withdrawal. 3) In economically developed areas such as Shanghai, rural households have a clear understanding of homestead land property rights, various property rights can be effectively guaranteed, and their willingness to withdraw is relatively high. Therefore, in the practice of homestead land withdrawal, exploring and establishing a withdrawal mechanism that endows rural households with more complete property

rights over homestead land and meets their reasonable expectations and compensation standards is conducive to guiding the orderly withdrawal of rural households from homestead land.

Full Text

Assessment of Farmer Willingness to Exit Rural Homestead Based on Collective Land Property Rights Functions: An Empirical Analysis of Songjiang and Jinshan Districts in Shanghai

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Abstract: Farmer withdrawal from rural homesteads is a critical issue concerning China's urbanization and new rural construction. This study examines the influencing factors of farmer homestead exit decisions from the perspective of property rights functions. Through field surveys in Songjiang and Jinshan Districts of Shanghai, we established a Logistic regression model with 29 indicators as baseline variables to quantitatively analyze farmer willingness to exit homesteads based on their rights and functions over homesteads under collective land property rights. The results show that: (1) Farmers have a clear understanding of their homestead rights and strong exit willingness. They are particularly concerned about expected compensation and post-exit economic conditions in their welfare perceptions, and they strongly desire to develop homesteads into commercial land as part of their development rights cognition. (2) The main functions farmers enjoy over homesteads include residential security, use rights, and property interests. Clear understanding of homestead functions strengthens self-interest protection awareness, and safeguarding farmer rights from infringement is a prerequisite for active voluntary participation in homestead exit programs. (3) In economically developed regions like Shanghai, farmers have clear cognition of homestead functions, their various rights can be effectively protected, and exit willingness is relatively high. Therefore, in homestead exit practice, exploring mechanisms that grant farmers more complete homestead functions while meeting reasonable expectations and compensation standards can facilitate orderly farmer homestead exit.

Keywords: Collective land; Property rights functions; Homestead withdrawal; Farmer willingness; Property rights cognition

Under current Chinese law, collective land use rights face restrictions on disposition and income rights compared to state-owned land use rights, which hinders collective land use rights from entering market circulation and affects the realization of property rights holders' interests in the market. Currently, rural collective land use rights transfer is widespread, but due to lack of legal

support, the transfer order is non-standard and inefficient. The Constitution, Land Administration Law, Property Law, and General Principles of Civil Law all clearly stipulate that rural land belongs to collective ownership, but fail to clearly define who represents this “collective ownership.” The Constitution vaguely defines it as collective ownership, the General Principles of Civil Law defines it as township (town) and village-level ownership, while the Land Administration Law defines it as township (town), village, or village-level collective economic organization ownership. Under these provisions, land ownership attribution, who exercises corresponding rights, and the connotation of rights are ambiguous. Homestead property rights belong to the collective, but it remains unclear which collective—whether village, group, or town—and whether villages and groups are autonomous organizations or economic organizations is fuzzy.

Collective land property rights functions generally include public nature, exclusivity, divisibility, restrictions on collective land property rights disposition, and benefit sharing. Rural homesteads are equivalent to state-owned allocated construction land. Based on collective land property rights functions, homestead functions generally include free and indefinite-term possession and residence rights, homestead use rights, income rights, disposition rights, and development rights. When homesteads no longer serve residential functions, they must be reclaimed as construction land or their quotas transferred. Collective organization members obtain residence functions for free, but face restrictions upon exit. Compared with state-owned allocated construction land disposition, the market-oriented exit of homesteads obtained for free requires payment of “transfer fees” for non-agricultural construction land—that is, the value-added portion.

Research in developed countries like the United States and Japan on rural homesteads mainly focuses on sustainable homestead development, land consolidation after village abandonment, driving forces and empirical analysis of rural homestead expansion, and emphasizes the importance of scientific local government decision-making for effective management of rural homestead expansion. Domestic research on farmer homestead exit concentrates on the necessity of homestead exit, influencing factors of homestead exit willingness, homestead exit mechanisms, homestead exit compensation methods, homestead exit models, satisfaction with living environments after homestead exit, and homestead exit policy evaluation. Regarding influencing factors of homestead exit willingness, studies find that farmers’ willingness is mainly affected by individual characteristics, family characteristics, basic homestead conditions, and property rights cognition. The impact of farmers’ homestead property rights cognition on exit willingness has been analyzed from perspectives of homestead ownership cognition, disposition rights, inheritance rights, and mortgage rights. Results show that farmers’ cognition of homestead ownership, disposition rights, and inheritance rights as “belonging to themselves” positively affects exit willingness, while cognition of homestead mortgage rights as “belonging to themselves” negatively affects exit willingness. China began homestead exit models primarily through urban-rural construction land increase-decrease linkage in 2005. The Tianjin Binhai New Area national experimental zone adopted a dual-track model. Although local

homestead exit pilots have saved construction land space, saved construction land quotas, and improved land use efficiency, they still commonly infringe upon farmers' land property rights. China's rural homestead system reform involves not only core land system issues but also farmers' primary concerns as property rights holders.

Reviewing the above research, few studies address the homestead function aspects that farmers care about most among influencing factors, and even fewer analyze influencing factors of farmer homestead exit willingness from the perspective of collective land property rights functions. This paper analyzes farmer homestead functions based on collective land property rights functions and examines their impact on farmer homestead exit willingness. From the perspectives of public nature, divisibility, restrictions on collective land property rights disposition, and benefit sharing of collective land property rights, we analyze farmers' possession, use, disposition, income, and other rights over homesteads. We examine the impact of farmer homestead functions on exit decision-making behavior in developed eastern regions based on collective land property rights functions. This provides important significance and reference value for the state to explore how to establish homestead exit models through top-level government design and legal aid that respect farmer willingness and realize rights protection, thereby increasing farmer property income, improving homestead use efficiency, and formulating homestead exit policies.

1.1 Research Area Overview

Shanghai is a national central city, economic and financial center, and prosperous international metropolis. With rapid economic and social development, land has become a very scarce resource in Shanghai's urban development process. To accelerate Shanghai's suburban urbanization process, farmer residence is being concentrated in towns based on respecting farmer willingness. Rural residential land is being advanced in an orderly manner, with scattered rural residential points being appropriately concentrated and merged. The rural residential population is decreasing, and scattered, remote village residential points are being demolished and consolidated. Empty spaces in rural residential points, old homesteads, and small natural villages with fewer than 10 households must be merged, and scattered natural villages with fewer than 50 households are being gradually compressed.

By the end of 2003, Shanghai had officially launched six central village projects covering six suburban counties, using over 170 hectares of land with total construction area of 960,000 m², planning over 4,800 households, enabling 15,000 farmers to live in comfortable, beautiful new homes. Additionally, among Shanghai's publicly tendered and auctioned land, the vast majority of plots are outside the outer ring road, concentrated in former Shanghai suburban counties, with Songjiang District and Jinshan District having the largest land transfer areas, releasing large amounts of homesteads. This paper conducts empirical analysis based on survey data of farmer homestead exit willingness in Shanghai's

Songjiang and Jinshan Districts.

1.2 Data Sources and Sample Characteristics

The authors conducted face-to-face household sampling surveys in Langxia Town of Jinshan District and Xinqiao Town of Songjiang District in late September 2015. Local farmers were the focus of the sampling survey. The sample size was determined using the Scheaffer sampling formula:

$$N^* = N / (1 + N\delta^2)$$

Where N^* is the sampling size, N is the number of local registered farmer households, and δ is the sampling error (set at 0.10). In 2014, Jinshan District had 93,332 registered farmer households and Songjiang District had 37,099. The calculated sampling size was about 198 households. The actual survey randomly selected 218 farmer samples from 10 villages in Jinshan and Songjiang Districts, excluding 50 resistant samples and 8 incomplete questionnaires, resulting in 160 valid questionnaires.

1.3 Variable Specification

Farmers' individual characteristics, homestead characteristics, and comparisons with replacement homestead housing all affect homestead exit willingness. The legal system also significantly impacts homestead exit. Homestead functions and the legal system for homestead exit are important guarantees for farmer homestead exit.

Farmer individual and family characteristic factors. These include gender, age, education level, average annual household income, whether family members have settled in towns, concurrent employment level, and concurrent employment time to understand farmer homestead exit willingness and influencing factors.

Farmers' cognition of homestead property rights. These include farmers' rights over homesteads, homestead ownership attribution, and homestead's role in the family to understand farmers' self-cognition of homestead property rights and analyze whether farmers voluntarily exit homesteads based on clear property rights cognition. Farmers are homestead use rights holders, while homestead ownership belongs to the collective. Farmers are owners of houses and attachments, enjoy collective welfare distribution, and have free and indefinite-term homestead use rights.

Impact of homestead exit (replacement) methods and resettlement. These include decision-making methods for homestead demolition, whether farmers have negotiation rights for homestead demolition, channels for learning about homestead demolition, whether the expropriation subject has the right to expropriate homesteads, and willingness to transfer homesteads to urban residents. These factors mainly reflect farmers' right to information and decision-making power over their homesteads.

Farmers' expectations and welfare perceptions of homestead exit. These include whether homestead property rights are registered, participation in homestead circulation, homestead circulation methods, whether compensation is reasonable, expected compensation, post-exit economic conditions, housing and environmental conditions, and employment status. These characteristics help understand farmers' rights to income distribution from homestead exit.

Farmers' cognition of homestead development rights. These include canceling land use restrictions, canceling land development time limits, willingness to change homesteads into commercial land, industrial land, or residential land. Development rights represent the right to change existing rural homestead use categories or conduct multi-dimensional development and utilization of rural homesteads. These are independent and transferable property rights separated from homestead ownership. These factors mainly reflect farmers' rights to homestead development rights.

From the perspective of clear homestead functions based on collective land property rights functions, this paper uses farmer homestead exit willingness as the explained variable and 29 indicators from five aspects—family characteristic factors, farmers' cognition of homestead property rights functions, impact of homestead exit (replacement) methods and resettlement, farmers' expectations and welfare perceptions of homestead exit, and homestead development rights factors—as explanatory variables to analyze influencing factors of farmer homestead exit willingness behavior. The statistical description of variables is shown in Table 1 .

1.4 Econometric Model

In the questionnaire design, farmers' behavioral willingness was divided into willing and unwilling, forming a clearly meaningful binary variable. We introduced the Logistic model, defined as:

$$P = 1 / (1 + e^{-(a - bX)})$$

Where P is the probability level of the explained variable Y' s corresponding value, a is the constant term, b is the regression coefficient of influencing factors, X is the explanatory variable (X1 represents individual and family characteristic variables, X2 represents farmers' property rights cognition variables, X3 represents impact of homestead exit (replacement) methods and resettlement, X4 represents farmers' expectations and welfare perceptions of homestead exit, X5 represents homestead development rights cognition variables), and ϵ is the random disturbance term, with i, j, k, l, h being the numbers of influencing factors respectively. To compare the impact degrees of different types of explanatory variables on farmer homestead exit behavioral willingness, we constructed six Logistic regression models: Model 1 only considers farmer individual and family characteristic variables; Model 2 considers farmer individual and family characteristic variables and farmers' property rights cognition characteristic variables; Model 3 considers farmer individual and family characteristic variables

and impact of homestead exit (replacement) methods and resettlement; Model 4 considers farmer individual and family characteristic variables and farmers' expectations and welfare perceptions of homestead exit characteristic variables; Model 5 considers farmer individual and family characteristic variables and farmers' homestead development rights cognition characteristic variables; Model 6 integrates all variables. We used the binary Logistic regression analysis module in IBM SPSS 19.0 to conduct regression analysis on different farmer homestead exit behavioral willingness.

2.1 Farmer Individual and Family Characteristic Variables

The survey sample investigated the basic social characteristics of interviewed farmers and their families, as well as policies on farmer homestead circulation. Analysis found that the basic characteristics of farmer households participating in homestead exit (Table 2) show that most exiting households have 3-6 family members, household heads are mainly aged 25-60, and education levels are primarily primary school and junior high school. Among homestead-exiting farmers, 7.5% of household heads are village group cadres, the average number of pure farming family members is 0.46, the average non-farming time for family members is 6.97 months, and average annual household income is 134,300 yuan. The average homestead area exited per household is 135.8 m².

From the descriptive variables of farmer individual and family characteristics (Table 3)—gender (X1), age (X2), education level (X3), average annual household income (X4), whether family members have settled in towns (X5), concurrent employment level (X6), and concurrent employment time (X7)—education level (X3) is a significant factor affecting farmer homestead exit willingness, with significance levels of $P=0.019$, $P=0.043$, $P=0.058$, and $P=0.033$ in Models 1, 4, 5, and 6 respectively, and an odds ratio greater than 1. This indicates that as education levels increase, farmers' cognition becomes more mature and they are more willing to actively and rationally exit their homesteads. Interviews revealed that while surveyed farmers' formal education is mainly junior high school and high school, their actual cultural level is generally higher than their formal education due to influence from Shanghai's developed economic and cultural environment. Average annual household income (X4) shows significance at $P=0.000$ in Models 5 and 6, indicating that higher-income households are more willing to exit their homesteads when compensation is reasonable, likely because they can afford housing in towns. Therefore, as long as economic compensation for homestead functions is reasonable, farmers will voluntarily exit homesteads. Other variables are not statistically significant at the 10% level.

2.2 Farmers' Cognition of Homestead Property Rights Characteristics

From the descriptive variables of farmers' property rights cognition (Table 3)—farmers' rights over homesteads (X8), homestead ownership attribution (X9),

and homestead' s role in the family (X10)—cognition of homestead rights (X8) has a significant negative impact on homestead exit willingness, with significance levels of $P=0.021$ and $P=0.031$ in Models 2 and 6 respectively, and an odds ratio greater than 1. This indicates that farmers have very clear cognition of homestead rights and clearly understand the personal equity nature of homesteads. The stronger farmers' dependence on homesteads, the less willing they are to exit. Homestead ownership attribution (X9) and homestead' s role in the family (X10) are significantly negative in Model 2, with significance levels of $P=0.011$ and $P=0.030$ respectively, and odds ratios greater than 1. This shows that farmers know homestead ownership belongs to the collective and that they have collective member rights to homestead use rights, recognizing the residential security function of homesteads for their families.

2.3 Impact Characteristics of Homestead Exit (Replacement) Methods and Resettlement

From the descriptive variables of farmers' cognition of homestead exit (replacement) methods and resettlement impact (Table 3)—willingness to transfer homesteads to urban residents (X11), decision-making methods for homestead demolition (X12), whether farmers have negotiation rights for homestead demolition (X13), channels for learning about homestead demolition (X14), and whether the expropriation subject has the right to expropriate homesteads (X15)—whether the expropriation subject has the right to expropriate homesteads (X15) is significantly impactful at the 10% level, with an odds ratio greater than 1. This indicates that farmers are concerned about the qualification of the expropriation subject and will not casually exit their homesteads because they know their rights.

2.4 Farmers' Expectations and Welfare Perceptions of Homestead Exit Characteristics

From the descriptive variables of farmers' expectations and welfare perceptions of homestead exit (Table 3)—whether homestead property rights are registered (X16), participation in homestead circulation (X17), whether participating in homestead circulation (X18), homestead circulation methods (X19), whether compensation is reasonable (X20), expected compensation (X21), post-exit economic conditions (X22), housing and environmental conditions (X23), and employment status (X24)—expected compensation (X21) and post-exit economic conditions (X22) are significant at the 5% level with positive impact. This shows that farmers are most concerned about their living and economic conditions after exiting homesteads. Homesteads are basic security for farmers' livelihood; if exiting cannot provide basic psychological security, farmers will refuse to exit. Whether participating in homestead circulation (X18) is significant at the 10% level with negative impact, indicating that while farmers are willing to participate in homestead exit, the compensation is not satisfactory.

2.5 Farmers' Cognition of Homestead Development Rights Characteristics

From the descriptive variables of homestead development rights (Table 3)—canceling land use restrictions (X25), canceling land development time limits (X26), willingness to change homesteads into commercial land (X27), industrial land (X28), and residential land (X29)—canceling land use restrictions (X25) is significant at the 5% level with positive impact. Development rights have independent meaning and status in the land rights system; farmers hope to cancel land use restrictions to circulate homesteads according to their own wishes, fully protecting their interests and hoping to enjoy the same land market rights as urban land users. Canceling land development time limits (X26) is significant at the 5% level with negative impact, indicating that farmers are willing to exit homesteads but must have their rights protected. Willingness to change homesteads into commercial land (X27) shows significance levels of $P=0.000$ and $P=0.007$ in Models 5 and 6 respectively, with an odds ratio greater than 1. This indicates that with rapid socio-economic development, urban land scarcity and expansion have greatly increased land demand, and farmers want to participate in the wave of rapid economic development by increasing the economic value of homestead use rights.

3 Discussion and Conclusions

Based on the perspective of farmers' collective land property rights functions, this paper analyzes farmer homestead exit willingness and influencing factors. The key to reflecting collective land ownership rights is that farmer members truly own the ownership, and ownership functions should reflect the common will of collective members rather than being actually controlled by agents of collective members. Farmers must exit their homesteads voluntarily only when their exit willingness and emotions are well respected and their legitimate rights and interests are effectively protected. The reasonable circulation of farmer homestead use rights must fully protect the realization of usufructuary rights of homestead use rights and houses, as well as the realization of farmers' property value-added interests. The initial free acquisition of homesteads addresses farmers' residence rights; on the premise of ensuring farmers have places to live, farmers should be granted more complete homestead functions. Farmers certainly expect to enjoy the highest income portion when exiting homesteads. When all homestead functions are granted to farmer members, market-oriented transactions of their member rights require payment of "transfer fees" equivalent to urban allocated construction land—that is, the value-added portion. With reasonable and fair distribution of homestead equity based on farmers' functions, reasonable compensation for homestead exit, and improved farmer economic conditions, farmers will actively participate in homestead exit.

This paper takes Shanghai as the study area, and empirical analysis results show that farmers' cognition of collective land property rights functions signif-

icantly impacts homestead exit willingness. When farmers' rights to collective land ownership and homestead possession, use, disposition, and income distribution rights based on collective land ownership interests are fully protected, farmers will actively participate in homestead exit. Based on clear collective land property rights functions cognition, if farmers' rights and interests are not protected, they are unwilling to participate in homestead exit, especially since homestead development rights and homestead exit property income rights significantly impact farmer homestead exit. Therefore, this provides important guidance for Shanghai local governments to actively guide farmer homestead circulation by formulating reasonable homestead circulation policies based on clear and complete property rights functions. It also provides guidance for less economically developed regions compared to Shanghai in formulating farmer homestead exit and circulation policies. However, this paper has limitations: due to survey data defects, it temporarily fails to consider impacts of different regional economic differences on homestead exit, and the survey sample scope needs further expansion. This paper uses the Logistic regression model from previous studies to measure homestead exit willingness; future research will explore improved methodologies to deeply analyze homestead exit willingness and impacts, improve land resource allocation efficiency, protect farmer rights and interests, and promote sustainable rural economic development.

Based on the perspective of farmers' land property rights functions, this paper analyzes farmer homestead exit willingness and influencing factors, reaching the following main conclusions:

- 1) Farmers have relatively clear cognition of the rights they enjoy over collectively allocated homesteads and are more inclined to exit their homesteads when rights compensation is reasonable. Farmers are particularly concerned about expectations and welfare perceptions of homestead exit and development rights perceptions regarding post-exit land use changes. With rapid economic development, farmers' concurrent employment levels and time have become increasingly evident, and farmers' non-agricultural income has greatly improved compared to the past. Farmers' ability to purchase housing in towns has strengthened. Compared to the past, the housing security function of rural homesteads is no longer as important, and farmers are more inclined to transfer, lease, or sublease their homestead use rights.
- 2) The allocated homesteads belong to collectively owned land, with ownership belonging to the village collective. Farmers mainly enjoy functions including residential security, use rights, and property interests. Most farmers are willing to exit their homesteads when homestead property rights functions are clear and property rights distribution is reasonable. However, currently, farmers' functions over homesteads have not been implemented in homestead circulation, and farmers lack rights of possession, use, income, disposition, and ultimate control over their allocated homesteads, making it impossible to protect the rights and interests they

enjoy. Meanwhile, farmers do not truly enjoy the right to information and decision-making participation in homestead exit and circulation plans. Most farmers are unwilling to exit their homesteads under current conditions of absent homestead functions and unprotected rights and interests.

- 3) Farmers must have their interests protected from damage to be willing to participate in homestead exit; otherwise, it is difficult for the government to make them voluntarily exit their homesteads. As collective-owned land, farmers' various functional factors over homesteads have become important influencing factors for Shanghai farmers' homestead exit. Farmers in Shanghai have relatively high education levels, and even those with lower formal education have higher comprehensive qualities due to influence from Shanghai' s developed economic and cultural environment. Farmers have clear cognition of homestead functions and very strong awareness of homestead property rights and self-interest protection. Farmers clearly know they have free and indefinite-term homestead use rights, and besides the residential security function, they also enjoy economic benefits from functions such as transfer, lease, sublease, and development rights after homestead use changes. When the distribution of homestead equity based on farmers' functions is reasonable and fair, and homestead exit brings high expected benefits and good welfare, farmers actively participate in homestead exit. Through empirical analysis of Shanghai case areas, Shanghai farmers tend to exit their homesteads.

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